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COMMENT
The Bomb Can Do No Wrong: From
Blackstonean Misconception to the
Technological God
Rest in Peace For the mistake shall not be repeated.'
I. INTRODUCTION
From 1945 to 1962 the United States conducted over 235 atmos-
pheric tests with various forms of nuclear weaponry.2 Scores of
thousands of Japanese civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki perished in
the second and third "test" shots.' "Wartime necessity" continues to op-
erate as the sole official rationale for the acts.4 After World War II
ended, over 250,000 United States servicepersons were subjected to po-
1. Words carved in stone on the memorial centotaph in Hiroshima Peace Park, Hiroshima
Japan.
2. Atomic Veterans' Relief Act of 1985: Hearings on H.R. 1613 Before the Subcomm. on Com-
pensation, Pension, and Insurance of the House Comm. on Veterans'Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 204
(1985) [hereinafter House Hearings] (prepared statement of David Gorman, Assistant Nat. Leg. Dir.
for Veterans' Administration Medical Affairs). But see Bennet, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and
the Weapons of War, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 383, 393 (1985) (asserting over 600 tests).
3. The United States Department of Energy now classifies the atomic bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, Japan as "Announced United States Nuclear Tests." H. WASSEREMAN & N. SOLO-
MON, KILLING OUR OWN: THE DISASTER OF AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE WITH ATOMIC RADIATION
280 (1982) [hereinafter KILLING OUR OWN]. The number of deaths caused by the bombings is
estimated at 140,000 in Hiroshima and 70,000 in Nagasaki. HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, infra note
126, at 115.
4. Compare H. TRUMAN, TRUMAN SPEAKS 67 (1960) ("The dropping of the bombs stopped the
war, saved millions of lives.") with DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY, FACT SHEET 2 (Aug. 6, 1980),
reprinted in 1983 Senate Hearings, infra note 5, at 61 ("The objective of the bombings was to bring
World War II to a quick end, and thereby avoid many months of fighting and continued destruction,
and the deaths of an estimated million U.S. servicemen .... "). But see G. ALPEROVITZ, ATOMIC
DIPLOMACY HIROSHIMA & POTSDAM: THE USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB & THE AMERICAN CON-
FRONTATION WITH SOVIET POWER 1-61 (Penguin ed. 1985) (suggesting a motivational force for the
bombings was to stimulate Soviet Union fear); infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (addressing
the fundamental military doctrine of "reprisal" and its possible role in legitimizing the bombings as a
response to the devastating surprise attack on Pearl Harbor); infra note 110 (addressing the belief
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tentially lethal doses of bomb-generated radiation at Nevada proving
grounds and in areas of the Pacific Ocean.5 The precise number of pre-
mature deaths caused by these atomic tragedies will never be known.
What is certain is that national security objectives have served as justifi-
cation for atomic testing during the past forty years.6
The steadfast positions of Atomic Age miltary leaders are not re-
stricted to the realm of weapons testing. For example, the atomic-mili-
tary mindset7 continues to cling to the outdated mid-twentieth century
vision that a nuclear war can be won,' thereby downgrading the severity
of escalating dangers accompanying technological advances in nuclear
among some scholars that the bombings were strategically designed to gauge the aftereffects of
atomic weaponry).
Truman's influence on today's presidential policies deserves attention. Subsequent to the Water-
gate Affair, the American public sought solitude from presidential power abuses by seeking refuge in
the Truman era. Truman, conceptualized as a folk hero, escaped blame for creation of "[a] secrative,
quasi-independent presidency, indifferent to the law or limitations imposed by the Constitution .... "
A. THEOHARIS, THE TRUMAN PRESIDENCY: THE ORIGINS OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE vi (1979). Few realize that the creation of the National Security
Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, under Truman, led to the systematic obstruction of
Department of State control over foreign policy objectives and an upsurge in covert governmental
operations. Id. at 10, 218-48. Moreover, Truman began the scrutinization of governmental employ-
ees under loyalty directives. See Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947); see also Exec.
Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953) (under Eisenhower), Exec. Order No. 11605, 36 Fed.
Reg. 12831 (1971) (under Nixon); see generally E. BONTEcou, THE FEDERAL LoYALTY-SEcURITY
PROGRAM (1953) (discussing the development and effects of loyalty programs in the midst of the
Red Scare era).
Trumanesque influences apply with equal force to the atomic weapons context. Compare C. GIR-
RIER & A. KRASS, DISPROPORTIONATE RESPONSE: AMERICAN POLICY AND ALLEGED SOVIET
TREATY VIOLATIONS 17-73 (1987) (addressing increasing U.S. atomic armaments in the 1980s
amidst alleged Soviet violations of arms treaties) with I FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES: NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 262-72, 282-88, 290-92
(1977) (extracts of Truman national security directives calling for an increase in atomic armaments,
including development of the hydrogen bomb, due to Soviet development of the A-bomb).
5. See Veterans' Exposure to Ionizing Radiation as a Result of Detonations of Nuclear Devices:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 5 (1983) [hereinafter
1983 Senate Hearings] (prepared statement of Hon. Arlen Specter); cf Huyghe & Konigsberg, Grim
Legacy of Nuclear Testing, N.Y. Times Magazine, Apr. 22, 1979, § 6, at 70 (asserting over 400,000
victims).
6. Compare KILLING OUR OWN, supra note 3, at 58 (1950s atomic testing was "couched in
national-security terminology") with infra note 256 (addressing Ronald Reagan's position on atomic
testing).
7. "Atomic-military mindset" relates to the thinking processes of military policy makers who
rely on atomic arsenal foundations. For detailed analyses of growing atomic military might on a
global scale, see generally STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WORLD
ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT: SIPRI YEARBOOK 1986 (1986) [hereinafter SIPRI YEARBOOK].
8. See, eg., Los Angeles Times, Jan. 24, 1980, at 1 (Interview of presidential candidate George
Bush), reprinted in S. HILGARTNER, R. BELL & R. O'CONNOR, NUKESPEAK: THE SELLING OF
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 207 (Penguin ed. 1983).
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war fighting capabilities. While this failure to adapt to modem military
reality is unfortunate, especially to future generations, the abandoned
casualties of American atomic policies have already suffered in the most
profound manner imaginable-they have lost their lives.
Despite state of the art medical evidence linking low-level exposure
to radiation with numerous deadly diseases, the federal judiciary, Con-
gress, and administrative agencies, such as the Veterans Administration
(VA), continue to provide spurious excuses for denying nearly all atomic
tort9 victims relief. Courts cite liability principles with roots in monarchi-
cal England, while Congress focuses upon the financial aspects of com-
pensation proposals. VA officials merely assert that low level radiation
does not kill. This Comment will demonstrate that the key to under-
standing the perpetuation of atomic tort injustices transcends legal dog-
matism, the security of the federal fisc, and scientific debate over
radiation's effects upon humans.
Examining existing atomic weapon and victim-care policies within
the framework of possible nuclear annihilation sheds new light on the
relationship that a superpower nation has with nuclear weaponry. The
affair embraces the atomic bomb, albeit tacitly, like a twentieth century
deity. 10 From an empirical standpoint, the "religious" activities of the
Atomic Age are indiscernible through senses preconditioned by a com-
mon faith in laws and leaders. Moreover, our lives are void of overt cere-
monial exercises like those engaged in by bomb worshipers of the motion
picture genre." Yet examples of atomic bomb idolatry are verifiable, 2
[f you believe there is no such thing as a winner in a nuclear exchange, that argument
makes little sense. I don't believe that.
You [win a nuclear war by] hav[ing] survivability of command and control, survivability
of industrial potential, protection of a percentage of your citizens, and you have a capa-
bility that inflicts more damage on the opposition than it can inflict on you. That's the
way you have a winner, and the Soviets' planning is based on the ugly concept of a
winner in a nuclear exchange.
[If everybody fired everthing he had, . .. more than [five percent of the population
would] survive.
For an excellent analysis of humankind's inability to adapt to the rapidly changing technological
world, see generally J. ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964).
9. The act of exposing humans to atomic bomb generated radiation is referred to throughout
this Comment as the "atomic tort."
10. For a brief discussion of religion's place in the nuclear arms area, see infra notes 12 & 206.
11. Note, for example, the bomb-worshiping activities of the hooded silo dwellers a machine
gun wielding Charelton Heston eliminated in the movie Beneath the Planet of the Apes. (Twentieth
Century Fox 1970).
12. Examples of bomb idolatry are realized through analogy. For example, under the deterrence
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suggesting the core of this quasi-religious activity is embodied within the
citizenry's implicit acceptance of a nuclear-based national security
force. 3 Passivity in the face of conceivable global annihilation is learned
behavior, a reflection of existence in a technologically-driven, desensi-
tized, information-overloaded society.
Messages presented to us as members of a social collective are re-
sponsible for existing perceptions of life-including the prioritizing of
our needs and their means of fulfillment. For example, modern advertis-
ing exploits the natural desire for social acceptance by analogizing
"beauty" to physical attributes such as white teeth, shiny hair, and a trim
body. Advertisers create an image, fragment it, then reap the monetary
benefits of each marketable ingredient. Individuals accepting the myth
seek "happiness" and personal security by pursuing the realization of
standards which are strategically designed to be unattainable. Goals are
set high, for financial rewards diminish when the goals are achieved. The
myth results in mass passivity, deference to the image maker.
Democracy, like "beauty," is the aggregate of numerous abstrac-
tions. When defined, simplistically, as the residence of sovereign power in
a body of equal people, the political concept demonstrates its reducible
nature. While components of the ideology, such as "equality," can be
criticized as mythological or accepted as truth,14 depending upon one's
theory of mutually assured destruction, an atomic arsenal "protects" because of its ability to induce
and prevent, through fear of retaliation, holocaustic harm. While most of us never see or touch an
atomic weapon, we acknowledge their existence. The devices have demonstrated their destructive
capabilities in the past. The resulting sense of security resembles a faith akin to Judeo-Christian
conceptions of God as portrayed in the Old Testament. "Never again will I doom the earth.., nor
will I ever again strike down all living beings .... " Genesis 8:21. Tax dollars used to develop these
weapons can be viewed as donations to carry on the protector's work. Humans and animals have
been sacrificed in the name of atomic security. Compare text accompanying notes 5 & 220 (referring
to atomic tests involving human and animal participants) with Exodus 20:24 ("make an alter of earth
and sacrifice on it ... your sheep and goats and your cattle."). Moreover, the state protects the bomb
from symbolic acts of destruction supported by Biblical teachings. See United States v. Kabot, 797
F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733 (1 1th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1985); see also infra note 206 (discussing Allen in detail).
13. The force, more specifically, constitutes a power that allegedly protects our country from
disruptive forces such as communism and individual, internal dissent.
14. The complexity of modem existence forces us to approach life in fragmented fashion. We
tend to chase the attainable while subordinating ideological promises appearing beyond reach. This
is learned behavior, given that the "lessons" one receives are often dictated by her stereotyped niche
in the pool of social interaction. Societal prejudice plays a key role in the process.
The rights we possess are constantly fluctuating. Yet injustices, such as sexism and racism, will
not down. See infra note 17. This reality is due, in part, to our educational system. "One must utilize
the education of the young to condition them to what comes later. The schools are transformed
under such conditions, with the child integrated into the conformist group in such a way that the
individualist is [not) tolerated.., by the authorities .... J. ELLUL, PROPAGANDA: THE FORMA-
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social indoctrination, we all share a desire to be safe and secure from
disruption. External disruptions lead to war, economic or militaristic,
while internal strife, often resulting from conflicting exercises of individ-
ual rights, calls the government to task in a different way. In each in-
stance, however, maintaining security and order are primary objectives.
The judiciary, for example, resolves disputes by designating one
party the victor. Maintaining a notion of fairness is achieved by the sys-
temic creation of a rights hierarchy, or designation of a law as constitu-
tionally valid. The system's reward is order. We defer to the higher
decision making authority by obeying its mandates. Noncompliance re-
sults in punishment, the social rejection of individual action. Therefore,
law and advertising share the common feature of dictating notions of
"happiness" while prescribing possible routes through which the desired
end may be obtained.
The existence of this phenomenon surfaces most clearly during war,
where preservation of national security and ideal transcends individual
existence. Yet even in times of peace, when our perceptions are overshad-
owed by the immediate demands of existence, our sense of security never
solidifies. Projections of existing threats magnify both dangers and the
intensity of corresponding security measures. Propaganda is a catalyst in
the process.
Professor Jacques Ellul, in his critical analysis of propaganda, 15 as-
serts that "state proclaimed truth,"-aggregated facts forming an intri-
cate web of consistent information-"must be all embracing" in order to
fit into a system of life providing "a complete answer to all questions
occurring in the citizens' conscience."' 6 Law is merely one strand of the
informational web. Chasing a socially acceptable goal, or unselfishly lay-
ing down one's life so that others may pursue their goals, necessitates the
creation of stubborn trust and faith in the system. Where such faith and
trust exist, the web of atomic dogmatism may be spun.
TION OF MEN'S ATTITUDES 13 (K. Kellen & J. Lerner trans. 1971). In rare instances, the collective
conscience is raised and changes occur, yet the tedium of technological life and lessons instilled at an
early age can quickly thrust us back into the fragmented reality of learned myths. As de Touqueville
noted, the sovereignty of the people "generally remains... concealed from view. It is obeyed with-
out being recognized, or if for a moment it be brought to light, it is hastily cast back into the gloom
of the sanctuary." A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55 (R. Heifer ed. 1956). Unfor-
tunately, as togetherness is usually out of view, the will of a few select leaders determines our desti-
nies. This Comment addresses one disasterous effect of such an existence.
15. J. ELLUL, PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN'S ATTITUDES (K. Kellen & J. Lerner
trans. 1973). Ellul's commentary on propaganda forms the foundation for many of the views ex-
pressed in this Comment.
16. Id. at 251. On information's relationship to propaganda, see id. at 112-16, 144-47.
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More specifically, governmentally-generated assertions must not dis-
turb the ideological construct upon which a society is based 17 in order to
diffuse conceptually 8 into preexisting views such as the "good versus
evil" dichotomy of U.S./Soviet military relations. 19 To do otherwise
would be analogous to an advertiser trying to sell toothpaste by guaran-
teeing that it promotes cavities and an ugly smile.
Ellul suggests that the production of uniform information formu-
lates a myth which results in a democratic religion, a creed "used to
integrate the masses into the national collective."20 He claims, "[W]hen
one speaks to us of 'massive democracy' and 'democratic participation'
these are only veiled terms that mean 'religion.' "21 Unfortunately, as
members of the existing "church," paradoxically we are forced to accept
nuclear weapons as our protectors, given the global scheme of unstable
world relations and our innate need for security. Grasping the fact that
these devices may have already killed tens of thousands of Americans is
difficult, for such an actuality runs contrary to the most basic freedom of
all. Our failure to assimilate the abandonment of atomic bomb victims is
best explained by tracing developments leading to nuclear worship, an
ancillary of democratic religion.
This Comment will unfold the perplexing mystery of the un-
redressed A-bomb tort through documented accounts evidencing a
dearth of bureaucratic compassion in the face of human distress. Part
17. "Equality," a component of the democratic ideal, serves as one example. Ellul asserts that
effective propaganda in Western countries is focused at the densest socio-economic group. Id. at 105.
The creation and maintenance of an "average culture," where education functions to indoctrinate
members to symbols and stereotypes, combines with lifestyle normalcy, common reflexes to informa-
tion, and established myths and ideologies. Id. at 105-17. Democracy serves as the "basic doctrine"
of life while promulgated myths, such as racial and sexual stereotypes, help members of the main-
stream develop answers for problems reflecting contradictions in the ideology, such as inequality of
opportunity.
18. In technological societies humans are bombarded with factual information. The ability to
discover from whence many of these conclusory propositions came proves impossible. As a result,
facts and events are synthesized into gereral themes to avoid troubling inconsistencies. The result is a
loss of reasoning capabilities and a departure from a reality far too complex to understand. Id. at 46-
48. This phenomenon was recognized in the nineteenth century. The American "has perpetually
occasion to rely on ideas which he has not had leisure to search to the bottom; for he is much more
frequently aided by the seasonableness of an idea than by its strict accuracy. ... A. DE Toc-
QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 165 (D. Heffner ed. 1956).
19. When faced with contradictory assertions, most persons, given little time for deep contem-
plation, simply accept "simple solutions, catchwords, certainties, continuity, commitment, a clear
and simple division of the world into Good and Evil, efficiency, and unity of thought." J. ELLUL,
supra note 15, at 254-55.
20. Id. at 251.
21. Id.
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Two addresses the historic origins of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
both in England and the United States, to demonstrate the lack of an
adequate justification for the canon's existence. Part Three focuses upon
our government's ability to manipulate Americans' collective perceptions
of atomic weapons and the catastrophic consequences which result from
the unleashing of the atom. Specifically, the mistreatment of Japanese
victims will illustrate this device in the context of nationalistic security
concerns and ethnic hatred. Part Four offers an historic overview of
atomic bomb testing in the United States. Test participant and civilian
perspectives are examined in relation to disinformation campaigns de-
vised by the military. Part Five provides a legal analysis of the judiciary's
attempts to justify evocation of the immunity doctrine when faced with
the atomic tort. Judicial justifications become mere rationalizations re-
flecting pre-Atomic Age modes of thought. This Comment asserts that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, although it changes in appearance, is
no more than a legal euphemism for the imputation of absolute, uncon-
testable power to isolated, yet universally unjust, actions by a finite ruling
body. Legal analysis within the context of the historical mistreatment of
atomic bomb victims will prove that the imperceivable higher force once
used by kings to legitimize unjust actions has metamorphosed into the
tangible nuclear bomb, an omnipotent force of cataclysmic proportions
paradoxically usurping from its creators the power to ensure a secure
existence.
II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE
OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
By holding captive grants of consent to be sued, a government selec-
tively insulates itself from liabilities arising out of its tortious conduct. A
"self-determinative" 22 doctrine, sovereign immunity functions to legiti-
mize the state's conduct, while inducing undemocratic dogmatism.23 The
true nature of sovereign immunity in the Nuclear Age, however,
22. In the context of this Comment, "self determinative" relates to sovereign immunity's role in
legitimizing national security policies which cost individuals their lives. The doctrine performs this
function by quashing legal challenges to military decisionmaking.
23. See James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CH. L. REV. 610,
610 (1955). James viewed the doctrine, in light of twentieth century governmental intrusion into
injury producing activity, as depriving innocent victims the benefit of effective and efficient loss
distribution. "The device of governmental liability offers machinery for both compensation and dis-
tribution; it should be used to compensate the victims of government at least to the full extent of the
fault principle except in situations where there are cogent reasons of extrinsic policy for withholding
compensation." Id. at 653. For additional insight into the fault principle, see R. PROSSER AND W.
KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 608-09 (5th. ed. 1984).
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stretches far beyond mere freedom of state action to the manipulation of
collective perceptions focusing upon the consequences of those actions.24
This technologically-aided process, virtually unthreatened by victims'
pleas,25 enables the state to inflict profound losses at the level of the indi-
vidual while escaping societal condemnation under the rubric of national
security mandates.26
Once the citizenry is convinced that particular state action is in its
best interest, even unconscionable conduct 27 escapes social censure. Only
by examining history and coming to grips with modem reality do we
realize that our country's mid-twentieth century desire for national au-
tonomy backlashed on future generations. A leviathan 28 has evolved, an
immune military-atomic complex subordinating the liberties of its people
to the advancement of destructive devices. Neither immunity's form nor
its effects are static.
Professors Keeton and Prosser suggest "[t]he reasons of policy given
in support of any particular immunity are apt to be grounded in values
and perceptions of the times, with the change in values and perceptions,
the immunity itself is likely to undergo change as well. ' ' 29 Yet on a planet
where the existence of humankind swings on a nuclear weaponry pendu-
lum, the continued extension of immunity concepts in the atomic tort
area presents a maddening irony. The key term in Prosser and Keeton's
perception of the transfiguration of immunity is "likely"-a word prom-
ising nothing. While it is not within the purview of this Comment to
provide an exhaustive account of sovereign immunity's origins, an over-
view of its development and import into the American legal system is
offered to demonstrate that an adequate justification for its existence is
lacking.
24. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text; see also infra note 193 (addressing the atom
as a means of preservation).
25. See, eg., infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text (discussing governmental disinformation
concerning the physical ramifications of exposure to radiation in 1945 Japan).
26. See infra text accompanying note 120; cf infra text accompanying notes 193-94 (addressing
use of the mass media to promulgate governmental positions).
27. See infra notes 218-34 and accompanying text (explaining the development of the "Pen-
tomic" Army).
28. This "political beast" thrives off the fear of life's violent destruction by the nuclear weapons
of other nations. According to Hobbes, the government's primary concern should be "the procura-
tion of the safety of the people" and the "contentments of life." T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 242-43 (A.
Waller ed. 1935). On Hobbes' preoccupation with self-preservation, see F. McNEILLY, THE ANAT-
OMY OF LEVIATHAN 178-82 (1968).
29. R. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 23, at 1032.
[Vol. 37
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A. English Origins
While the precise genesis of the doctrine is uncertain,3" legal histori-
ans often cite a medieval English maxim, "the King can do no wrong,"31
as the seed which germinated into an established Anglo-American legal
principle.
The inaccurate perceptions of Sir William Blackstone lie at the core
of this tragic misconception. His claim that the King is "not only incapa-
ble of doing wrong but even thinking wrong"32 constitutes a radical de-
30. The question of whether English conceptions of governmental immunity flowed from an-
cient Rome has been addressed by various legal scholars. See Borchard, Theories of Governmental
Responsiblity in Tort, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 577, 580-81 (1928) (asserting influence); cf Parker, The
King Does No Wrong - Liability for Misadministration, 5 VAND. L. REv. 167 (1952) (suggesting
Roman counterpart).
31. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L. J.1, 17-35 (1926) [hereinaf-
ter Borchard VI]. In this section I draw extensively from the masterful works of Professors Borchard
and Pugh. Borchard provides an analysis of the maxim's development, concluding that a historical
misconception perverted the maxim "from its historical meaning that he [,the King,] was not privi-
leged to do wrong into the modern meaning that he was incapable of doing wrong." Id. at 35. See
also Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. Rnv. 476, 477-79
(1953). Pugh suggests that during the feudal system's downfall and simultaneous rise of the nation
state, the King's personal immunity, a concept commingling moral subjection to law and the ecclesi-
astical vicar's freedom from human control, was imputed to the concept of sovereignty. The King, in
essence, became the sovereign state, combining established earthly powers with deific privileges cre-
ated with new found control over the English church. See id. at n.ll. Thus state and ecclesiastical
power converged and diffused into the attending monarch's being, prompting Blackstone to distort
earlier interpretations of the Maxim into a belief that both "sovereignty" and "perfection" were
attributed to the King by law. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *246, cited in Pugh, supra note
35, at 479. Therefore, the development of a notion that the sovereign was "incapable of doing
wrong," in combination with the absence of a court possessing the power to enforce remedies against
the King, forged the conceptual notion of immunity. James, supra note 23, at 612; cf 1 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *242 (addressing the notion that perfection flows from a lack of judicial
jurisdiction).
It should be noted that Lord Coke, not Blackstone, coined the phrase: "It is a maxim of the law
that the King can do no wrong." E. COKE, INSTITUTES *73 (originally published in 1628).
32. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *246. Blackstone offered two reasons for the king's
inability to commit wrongs. First, the monarchical prerogative was created for the people's benefit,
therefore it could not possibly be evoked to their injury. Secondly, even if the king prejudiced a
subject, no court possessed the power to try actions or enforce remedies waged against him. Thus a
system which admits wrongs but provides no remedy would be absurd. 1 W. BLACKSONE, COMMEN-
TARIES *242-46; cf. In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 616 F. Supp. 759
(D.C.Cal. 1985), aff'd sub nom Konizeski v. Livermore Labs, 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied 108 S. Ct. 1076 (1988) (asserting the U.S. government knew of radiation dangers long before
atomic testing, while denying recovery to persons injured in atomic tests).
Blackstone's reasoning has been criticized via analogy. There exists no disease where there is no
cure nor an army, raised to defend a country's liberties, which cannot be employed to destroy those
liberties. J. ALLEN, INQUIRY INTO THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE IN
ENGLAND 32 (Thorpe ed. 1962). For an excellent analysis of the royal prerogative as perceived by
Blackstone, see id. at 1-36.
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parture from thirteenth century conceptions of English legal reality,33
when the petition of right was a viable means of challenging monarchical
misconduct. 34 During the fourteenth century, a growth in national con-
sciousness institutionalized the monarch's position, providing for an up-
surge in his or her personal power.35 Although the monarchical privilege
entailed a mandatory granting of permission prior to subjection to suit,
detailed procedural mechanisms existed for the invocation of relief, and
refusals to grant subjects' petitions were encased in legal rationales.36
Moreover, abuses resulting from unrestrained caprice were met by the
counterforce of the subjects' collective duty to the crown. 37 At this point
33. See Borchard VI, supra note 31, at 23-27. Edward I, ruling from 1272-1307, established
procedures, such as the petition of right, for instituting legal claims-evincing that he was not
deemed to be above the law. Id. at 23. See also J. ALLEN, supra note 32, at 93 (asserting that through
the reign of Henry III (1216-1272) the king "could be sued like a subject in the courts of law."); 1 H.
HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 17 n.k. (Butterworth ed. 1907)(suggesting until Edward I,
kings were treated like "common person" defendants). But see 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 465 (5th ed. 1931) ("It is remarkable that in Edward III's reign [1327-1377]
judges could still be found who believed the fable.., that there had been a time when the king was
sued in his own courts like an ordinary person."); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 516 (Cambridge ed. 1952)(Any account of the king being sued as a common person
were based upon "some joke, some forgery, or possibly some relic of the Barron's war .... If Henry
III [,Edward I's immediate predecessor,] had been capable of being sued, he would have passed his
life as a defendant."), construed in Pugh, supra note 31, at 477.
34. In cases not sounding in tort, petitions enabled the subject to gain monarchical consent to
suit. See I H. HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 17-18 (Butterwoth ed. 1907).
* In fictitious fashion, tortious acts committed by the king's servants, pursuant to order, were "pre-
sumed to be without his sanction. The subject might sue the actual tortfeasor and the latter could not
plead in his defense that it was done by royal authority." Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 VA.
L. REv. 399, 356 (1925). On the petition of right and its statutory import into twentieth century
England, see id. at 355-58.
Professor Harold Laski, critical of monarchical immunity as reflected in its modem day counter-
part - the Crown, addressed fictitious perfection in relation to individual rights violations. As early
as the twelfth century the king's ministers were amenable to suit in tort, yet still the "state cannot be
sued, because there is no state to sue. There is still no more than a Crown, which hides its imperfec-
tions beneath the cloak of assumed infallibility." Laski, The Responsiblity of the State in England, 32
HARV. L. REV. 447, 450 (1919).
35. Borchard V1, supra note 31, at 26.
36. Id. at 27.
Professor Laski viewed the petition of right as "an ungracious effort to do justice without the
admission of a legal claim." Laski, supra note 34, at 455. Because no court could compel compliance
with a judgment, the subject's relief was "dependent upon a combination of goodwill and the moral
pressure of public opinion." Id; cf infra notes 270-77 and accompanying text (addressing the alleged
transformation of governmental immunity in the United States through the Federal Tort Claims Act
of 1946).
37. The overthrow of Edward Il (1307-1327) resulted from this force. For an indepth analysis of
his vice-ridden reign, see T. TOUT, THE PLACE OF THE REIGN OF EDWARD II IN ENGLISH His-
TORY (1936).
Given the "Wars of the Roses" during the reign of Henry VI (1422-1461), "[i]t would be difficult
1988/89] THE BOMB CAN DO NO WRONG
in English history the King was by no means perceived as perfect nor
prosecution free,38 contrary to Blackstone's assertions in the post-Resto-
ration period.
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries marked the transition to
modem law and the extension of pre-existing rights of the subject to new
areas of equitable relief.39 Unfortunately, actions of the King resulting in
the infliction of physical injury fell beyond the rubric of these equity-
based procedural mechanisms.4' Unjust seizures of property were the re-
medial "torts" of the time.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, due to an increase in
state activity and fiscal reforms, English courts frequently extended lia-
bility to governmental employees and officials committing tortious con-
versions and breaches of contract."1 Yet the substance of Blackstone's
to invest with attributes of perfection a king of 'incorrigible disposition' and it would be even more
difficult to picture these attributes adorning a crowned head lodging an admittedly deficient brain."
Barry, supra note 34, at 352.
The King's Oath created an obligation to remove any monarch overextending his powers.
Borchard viewed the collective duty as a "constitutional limitation" on power, implying status
analogous to the United States Constitution's provision for impeachment proceedings. Borchard VI,
supra note 31, at 26; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § IV.
Interesting to note is the opinion in an 1879 Supreme Court case repudiating "the King can do no
wrong" as a principle applicable in the United States. "[T]he English Maxim does not declare that
the government, or those who administer it, can do no wrong; for it is part of the principle itself that
wrong may be done... our President, may be impeached, or... indicted and tried." Langford v.
United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1880); see Pugh, supra note 31, at 489 (placing Langford in the
context of the dilemma posed by the import of immunity concepts into the United States).
38. See Borchard VI, supra note 31, at 18. Borchard asserts that even prior to this time, the
Magna Charta ensured that "the king's acts were judged according to law, and.., the supposition
that the king was above the law did not prevail." Id. But see 1 F. POLLOCK AND F. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 515-18 (Cambridge ed. 1952) (asserting the king's freedom from suit
was well established). Contra Pugh, supra note 31, at 477 n.8 (construing Pollock and Maitland
differently).
39. Borchard VI, supra note 31, at 34. During this time period "the modem relations between
law and equity developed; ... the incidents of tenure ... and technical rules of land law became
obsolete, and that the law of contract, with the growth of commerce, assume[d] a new importance."
Id. Roscoe Pound summarized equity's import into the nineteenth century, "The residuary power of
the crown to do justice among his subjects has served to meet two crises in our legal history. When
the old polity of local courts became impossible, it gave us the king's courts and the common law.
When the common law was in danger of fossilizing, it gave us equity." Pound, Do We Need a
Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 339, 350 (1905).
40. See Pugh, supra note 31, at 479.
41. See Borchard VI, supra note 31, at 35. Borchard points out that the nineteenth century
brought with it a stretching of the seventeenth century conception that the petition of right should
"provide a remedy in all cases where the subject would have a remedy were the defendant a private
individual." Id.; cf. J. CHiTrY, THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVE CROWN 5 (1820). Chitty writes:
The inviolability of the King is essential to the existence of his powers as supreme magis-
trate; and therefore his person is sacred. The law supposes it impossible that the King
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misconception42 was mysteriously imputed to the English state and re-
suited in a modem concept-immunity of the Crown.43
Professor Borchard, whose work in the early twentieth century led a
drive against governmental irresponsibility,' summarizes the English
state's immunity from tort liability:
In view of the fact that the crown is expected to accord a remedy...
whenever a private defendant would be held liable... it seems unfortunate
that a historical misconception should have led to a departure from this
principle in matters of tort.... To this day, wrongful injuries to or takings
of property... are deemed proper subjects of the petition of right, though
manifestly torts with respect to property. Nor is it clear why "wrong"
should have been translated into "tort,"....
At all events none of the grounds advanced for ... sovereign immu-
nity, historical or theoretical, can today command serious respect or be re-
garded as convincing.45
The Crown Proceedings Act of 194746 created the right to sue the
English state in tort, evidence that the "English themselves have aban-
doned their traditional system and have attempted to formulate an inte-
grated statute.., more in keeping with the needs of modem society."
47
This development buttresses Prosser and Keeton's assertion regarding
the role changing societal values play in relation to alterations in
himself can act unlawfully or improperly. It cannot distrust him whom it has invested
with the supreme power: and visits on his advisers and ministers the punishment due the
illegal measures of government. Hence the legal apophthegem that the King can do no
wrong.
Id
Officer responsibility evolved due to the influence of natural law principles on equity in eighteenth
century England. Unfortunately, "equity... got tangled up in procedure .... It was not until well
toward the end of the nineteenth century that the substantive law began to get the upper hand in the
search for [the] analogical starting points [of liberty]. Pound, The Tort Claims Act: Reason or His-
tory? 37 TUL. L. REv. 685, 687 (1963).
42. See supra note 31.
43. To this day, an unequivocal explanation for this development is yet to be offered. For a
plausible argument, see Laski, supra note 34, at 448-53.
44. For a comprehensive look at the work of Borchard, see Borchard, Governmental Responsi-
bility in Tort (I-VI), 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25); 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27).
45. Borchard VI, supra note 31, at 35-37.
46. 10 & 11, Geo. VI, ch. 44 (1947).
47. Pugh, supra note 31, at 480. The Crown Proceedings Act of 1947 specifically provides for
intramilitary immunity. 10 & 11 Geo. VI, ch. 44, § 10 (1947). In the United States, intramilitary
immunity was created, in part, by the judiciary. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); see
also, Zillman, Intramilitary Tort Law: Incidence to Service meets Constitutional Tort 60, N.C.L. REV.
489 (1982) (contrasting the two systems).
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immunity.48
B. Sovereign Immunity in the United States
Analysis now turns to the historical growth of federal sovereign im-
munity in the United States, halting at the advent of atomic weaponry, to
bring to light the illogical and confused rationales accompanying impor-
tation of the ill-conceived doctrine to the new democratic state.
It is ironic that a doctrine reflecting monarchical prerogatives and
misconceived deific perfection was transplanted in an independent repub-
lic harboring an abhorrence towards capricious royal power4 9 and the
distasteful commingling of church-state authoritarianism. 50 Complicat-
ing comprehension of the doctrine's transatlantic voyage are constitu-
tional provisions establishing a judicial system51 with powers extendible
to the illegal actions of the executive in chief.5" This development stood
48. See supra text accompanying note 29.
49. Independence created new conceptions of sovereignty, yet authoritative immunity stayed.
Here, the sixteenth century serves as the springboard for analysis.
Jean Bodin, writing in the late 1500s, viewed sovereignty as the absolute, unlimited control over
citizens and subjects, power vested in an omnipotezit creator of laws above their application. In
England, the King possessed sovereignty by divine right, maintaining this power in light of increas-
ing parliamentarian liberties by an uncontestable veto power. See C. WEsroN & J. GREENBERG,
SUBJECTS AND SOVEREIGNTY 88-89 (1981).
In the seventeenth century, John Locke viewed sovereignty in a quasi-contractual fashion - the
aggregate of conditional, individual surrenderments of natural rights to the state. His conception of
government rejected Bodin's unlimited control factor, for the individuals' will could supposedly rein-
stitutionalize government. See Willis, The Doctrine of Sovereignty Under the United States Constitu-
tion, 15 VIRG. L. REV. 437, 438-49 (1929).
The United States Constitution and early Supreme Court decisions reflect Lockean conceptions of
sovereignty - a delegation of natural rights followed by fluctuations in the power structure. See U.S.
CONST. preamble; U.S. CONST. art. V (embodying the delegation of individual-collective rights to
the legislative body); See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (Justice
Marshall asserting, "That the people have an original right to establish ... such principles as...
shall most conduce their own happiness... is the basis ... on which the whole American fabric has
been erected.").
50. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend. I; U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall
be granted by the United States .... ).
51. See U.S. CONST. art.III; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1787, repealed in part, 1795)(the exten-
sion of judicial power to controversies "between a State and Citizens of another State" and those
arising "between a State or the Citizens thereof, and foreign states, Citizens or Subjects" was abro-
gated by the Eleventh Amendment) U.S. CONST. amend. XI. But see cases cited in infra note 59 and
accompanying text. See also Young, Public Rights and Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's
Lessee through Crowel to Schor, 35 BUFFALO L. REV. 765 (1986). In the course of addressing an
upsurge in Supreme Court concern over the separation of powers, Young asserts, "The aim of these
provisions is to establish the judiciary as an independent branch of government, insulated from
grosser forms of political pressures transmitted through other branches." Id. at 768.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 ("[Ihe party... [once impeached] shall nevertheless be liable
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diametrically opposed to the situation in England, where no court pos-
sessed the power to enforce penal sanctions against the divine king. 3 The
system of checks and balances inherent in the newly devised Constitution
focused upon containing excessive assertions of individual power, but
overlooked the establishment of an apolitical system designed to alleviate
suffering caused by tortious governmental conduct. 4
A wrongdoer's internalization of costs associated with the external
infliction of irreversible, individual loss is a modern development of prag-
matic justice; but cash replaces neither life nor limb." However, the new
republic's need for cash played the key role in initiating an evolutionary
process which resulted in denials of even this inadequate form of com-
pensation to victims of atomic tortfeasance.
In the 1780s, fear that citizens would employ the proposed federal
constitution5 6 to recover enormous debts accruing to the states during
the Revolutionary War overcame inconsistencies between sovereign im-
munity's monarchical foundation and a fundamental tenet of American
jurisprudence-a government existing for the benefit of the people should
act in a responsible manner by acknowledging mistakes and redressing
consequences of its injurious actions.57
and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgement and Punishment according to Law."); U.S. CONsT. art
III, § 2, cl.3 ("Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury .... ").
53. See Borchard VI, supra note 31, at 18-21. In medieval England, the King exercised control
over both administrative and judicial machineries. Thus "[p]unishment, the usual expiration for
wrongs, could hardly be invoked against the king,... account[ing] for the fact that damages, with
their penal connotation, were not accessed . . ." Id. at 19; see also James, supra note 23, at 612
(asserting that Blackstone's era, 1723-1780, perceived infallability and a lack of judicial authority
over the king resulted in immunity); F. POLLOCK AND F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 518 (Cambridge ed. 1952) (discussing immunity as a result of having created the courts); cf. A.
MARTIN, SOVEREIGN-GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 13 (1965) (addressing the execution of Charles I
and the temporary transfusion of divine infallability into judicial figures presiding over the Mon-
arch's trial).
54. Determinations of governmental liability, in relation to monetary redress, rested solely
within the purview of congressional power. "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. See The Western
Star, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922), cited in Pugh, supra note 31, at 491. Justice Holmes stated, "The
United States has not consented to be sued for torts .... it cannot be said.. the United States has
been guilty of a tort. For a tort is a tort in a legal sense only because the law has made it so." Atomic
bombs cause no injuries when Holmesian reasoning is applied to the atomic tort crisis.
55. This unavoidable dilemma is compounded in severity by deficiencies in compensatory mech-
anisms. See R. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 23, at 597-615.
56. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (repealed in part 1795); cf U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
57. See Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, I, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 4 (1924).
Once made, a mistake of national consequence can produce a horrific injustice. Moreover, govern-
mental admittance of the error is often delayed, especially when the following circumstances exist:
(1) preexisting misinformation regarding a specific class of individuals; (2) action directed specifically
1988/89] THE BOMB CAN DO NO WRONG
Alexander Hamilton, in an attempt to quash states' financial fears,
wrote in the The Federalist, "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty,
not to be amenable to suit of the individual without its consent .... The
contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the con-
science of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive
force."
58
Six short years after ratification of the Constitution Hamilton's as-
sertion proved inaccurate, for the Supreme Court rejected the notion of
state immunity in Chisholm v. Georgia.9 The resultant resurrection of
financially-based fear, however, led to ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment6" two years later, effectively emasculating Chisholm's denial
at the misperceived group; (3) the stifling of the group's torment by governmental reinforcement of
prejudice; and (4) post-action denial of injury infliction via established procedural mechanisms. Jac-
ques Ellul, without refering to these criteria specifically, outlines how propaganda freezes prejudices
within a society. J. ELLUL, supra note 15, at 162-68. The result is a form of neurosis, a need for black
and white images reinforcing stereotypical rigidity. Id. at 167; see generally, K. HORNEY, THE NEU-
ROTIC PERSONALITY OF OUR TIME (1937) (addressing the problem in the context of anxiety and
hostility) cited in id. at 167 n.9. Thus mainstream hatred lies at the core of such governmental abuse.
An example of the phenomenon surfaces with a hindsight examination of Japanese internment
during World War II. The belief that Japanese citizens residing on the West Coast posed a threat to
national security satisfies factor (1) above. The infamous Executive Order 9066 resulted from the
misperception. The Supreme Court approved the internment directive. See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
It took three decades before President Gerald Ford rescinded Executive Order 9066. Nearly forty
years passed before the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction of a Japanese citizen who refused to
obey a California curfew. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); see also
Cox, After 44 years, VictoryforJapaneseAnmerican, Nat. L. J., Oct. 12, 1987, at 10, col. 2 (addressing
the discovery of 1940s military correspondence proving racism caused the internment directive). A
bill, providing for a congressional apology and $20,000 in compensation to each survivor of the
internment recently passed in the House. See H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Relief came,
but abominably late and only due to the happenstance discovery of previously hidden documents.
See infra notes 104-88 and accompanying text (the phenomenon addressed in the context of Japanese
A-bomb victims in the post World War II era); see also infra note 415 (addressing a Congressional
modification of VA claims adjudication procedures for atomic veterans in 1988).
58. THE FEDERALIST, No. 81, at 548-59 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), quoted in Pugh, supra note 31, at
482; see id. at 482-83 (addressing similar positions expressed by John Marshall and James Madison
at the Constitutional Convention). In this section I draw extensively from Professor Pugh's work,
which provides detailed analyses of the Supreme Court cases cited below.
59. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Even Justice Iredell, the sole dissenter, wrote, "A state does not
owe its origin to the government of the United States .... It was in existence before it. It derives its
authority from the same pure and sacred source itself: the voluntary and deliberate choice of the
people." Id. at 448. The departure from monarchical conceptions of sovereignty is evident. See also,
Pugh supra note 31, at 483-85 (construing analyses employed by select justices).
60. U.S CONST. amend. XI; (The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commmenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.); see supra note 51. Addi-
tional support came later from the Court as Chief Justice Marshall, in dictum, clothed adherence to
sovereign immunity with "universally received opinion." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264,
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of immunity while eliminating the possibility of sequential extensions of
individual fights beyond contractual relationships with states to actions
instituted against the federal government.
The Court avoided passing upon the issue of governmental liability
in the federal arena until 1834. In United States v. Clarke,61 Chief Justice
Marshall asserted that the United States government was non-suable ab-
sent consent provided by congressional mandate. Such "self evident" ra-
tionales continued until the late 1860s, when a judicial movement re-
emphasizing war-induced fiscal necessities attempted to justify immunity
on the ground that the imposition of liability would strip the government
of the monetary means needed for the administration of efficacious gov-
ernment. 62 These post-Civil War justifications were later criticized by
Professor James who asserted, "While control of government[al] activity
by private tort litigation may be involved where the alleged tort is legisla-
tive action or the making of some high-level policy decision, no such
thing is involved in ordinary accident cases.",63 Moreover, the policy jus-
411-12 (1821). For a detailed analysis of Marshall's position, see Pugh, supra note 31, at 485-86. A
century after adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court extended the scope of state immunity
to actions brought from within by its own citizens. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
61. 33 U.S. (7 Pet.) 436, 443 (1834) (consent to suit became the first judicially recognized inroad
to immunity). Professor Pugh recognized a tendancy among mid-nineteenth century jurists to dis-
miss attacks upon the doctrine without any "legal, logical, or historical" support. Pugh, supra note
31, at 486; see also Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United States 1790.
1955, U. ILL. L. F. 795, 796-97 (1966) (providing case analysis within the historical context of the
period); cf Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 19
(Kairys ed. 1983).
Professor Mensch, referring to the period between 1776 and 1885 as "Pre-classical consciousness"
writes:
During the disruptive and potentially radical period... follow[ing] the Revolution, elite
American jurists devoted themselves to reestablishing legal authority. As the embodi-
ment of reason and continuity, law seemed to offer the only source of stability in a nation
that otherwise threatened to dissolve into chaotic, leveling passions of a people now so
dangerously declared to be sovereign. In a flowery vocabulary drawn largely from the
natural-law tradition, late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century legal speakers made
extravagant claims about the role of law .... Law was routinely described as reflecting
here on earth the universal principles of divine justice, which, in purest form, reigned in
the Celestial City.
Id.
62. See Pugh, supra note 31, at 487-88 (citing Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122,
126 (1869) (a parade of horribles argument centering upon the collection of revenue), The Siren, 74
U.S. (7 Wall) 152, 153-54 (1869) (Justice Field asserting suits by members of the citizenry would
endanger authority and result in a governmental loss of control over the administration of govern-
ment)). But see id. at 159-60 (the creation of an exception of immunity premised upon governmental
initiation of suit).
63. James, supra note 23, at 614; cf Pugh, supra note 31, at 488 (citing modern developments in
governmental liability as having no adverse effect upon effective government); Willis, supra note 49,
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tifications offered for adherence to the doctrine, regardless of the era in
which they appear, reflect beliefs founded upon Marshall's implicit ac-
ceptance of Blackstone's misconception that a sovereign entity is incapa-
ble of harmming its members.
The injection of the ill-conceived doctrine into the United States es-
caped serious judicial scrutiny until the 1880s. The High Court stated in
United States v. Lee," "[Wihile the exemption of the United States...
from being subjected as defendants to ordinary actions in the courts has
... been repeatedly asserted... the principle has never been discussed or
(sic) the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as established
doctrine."65 Unfortunately, rather than attacking sovereign immunity
with a vengeance, the Waite Court opted for an "end run" approach by
asserting that the federal government did not constitute a necessary party
to the action, thereby granting relief and dismissing immunity as a nonis-
sue.66 The "end run," a rare finding of congressional consent to suit,
6 7
and governmental initiation of an action68 were the only available judi-
cially-created inroads to immunity as the United States entered the twen-
tieth century.69 Lee's expression of puzzlement over sovereign
immunity's axiomatic foundation did, however, send jurists frantically
searching for a long overdue, logical explanation for the doctrine's
existence.
In Kawananakoa v. Polyblank 70 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes at-
at 452-53 (asserting immunity from suit is a non-essential element of sovereignty). Victims of the
United States atomic weapons testing program have been unsuccessful in attacking national security
policies by asserting the tests violated their constitutional rights. See, e.g., Jaffee v. United states, 663
F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982); see also infra notes 328-342 and accom-
panying text (discussing Jaffee).
James' response pertains to late nineteenth century rationales, rather than the atomic tort which
falls far beyond the rubric of the "ordinary" accidents. For a prototypical, fourfold public policy
argument supporting sovereign immunity, and argumentative responses to each, see James, supra
note 23, at 614-15.
64. 106 U.S. 196 (1882); cited in Pugh, supra note 31, at 489.
65. Lee, 106 U.S. at 207.
66. Id. at 222-23.
67. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
68. See The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 152 (1869).
69. Kramer, supra note 61, at 799-801. Professor Kramer outlines the three judicial exceptions
and lists congressional acts waiving liability under specific circumstances. See Court of Claims Act of
1855, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 171, 1491-506 (1982 & Supp. 1987) (contract claims); Tucker Act of
1887, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (a)(2), 1491 (1982 & Supp.1987)(extentions to constitutional
claims, acts of Congress, and executive regulations); see also Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims
Against the Federal Government, 9 LAW & CONTEMp. PROBS. 311 (1942) (outlining the process by
which a private bill initiated in Congress may result in compensation).
70. 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
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tempted to solve the problem by reasoning that "A sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but
on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."'"
Professor Borchard, writing during the Holmesian era, responded, "And
comes the logical conclusion, as he is exempt from suit, therefore he can
do no wrong."' 72 Holmes has been widely criticized for reliance on Aus-
tin's vision of sovereignty,7 3 a position influenced by Bodin,74 and Hob-
bes.75 Holmes' withdrawal to seventeenth century political philosophy is
conservative, at best, for as one legal commentator has noted, "The doc-
trine of sovereign immunity... existed from time immemorial, from the
founding of the first government. It is inherent in ultimate power and
needs no proof .... It was unwritten law acknowledged by the people
71. 205 U.S. at 353 quoted in Borchard VI, supra note 31, at 38.
72. Borchard VI, supra note 31, at 38.
73. Austin viewed sovereignty as the ultimate power to effect habitual obedience from the mass
of society. Holmesean liability principles reflect this position:
According to [Austin] .... the characteristic feature of law... is a sanction or detriment
imposed by the sovereign for disobedience to [its] commands .... [Austin views] liability
to an action... as a penalty for disobedience. It follows from this, according to prevail-
ing views of the penal law, that such liability ought only to be based upon personal fault;
and Austin accepts that conclusion.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 66-67 (Howe ed. 1963).
74. See supra note 49 (addressing Bodin's views in relation to those of Locke); see also Willis,
supra note 49, at 440 (viewing Austin's position as a hybrid between Bodin and conceptions of
popular sovereignty).
75. Hobbes viewed the natural condition of humankind as "a condition of Warre of everyone
against everyone," a pre-civic state of unrest existing until the desires for peace and defense give rise
to "a mutual transfering of right ... which men call contract." T. HOBBES, LEVIATAN 87-89 (Waller
ed. 1935). This exchange created an institution with the power to punish, yet above its own laws, See
id. at 120-21. Sovereignty was absolute and uncontestable.
For an excellent critique of Holmes in relation to Hobbes and Austin, see Borchard, Governmen-
tal Responsibility in Tort, V, 36 YALE L.J. 757 (1927); see also Kramer, supra note 61 at 798-99
(attacking Holmes' assertion on historical, contextual, and institutional grounds); Pugh, supra note
31, at 490-93 (addressing Austinian conceptions lying at the core of Holmesian reasoning); ef.
Mensch, supra note 61, at 23-24.
Professor Mensch places Holmes in the period of "classical legal consciousness." In the context of
the public/private rights distinction, she states:
By the "rule of law" classical jurists meant quite specifically a structure of positivised,
objective, formally defined rights. They viewed the legal world . . . as a structure of
protected spheres of rights and powers. Logically derivable vacuum boundaries defined
for each individual her own sphere of pure private autonomy while simultaneously defin-
ing those spheres within which public power could be exercised freely and absolutely.
... To the classics, freedom meant the legal guarantee that rights and powers would
be protected as absolute within their own sphere, but that no rightholder/powerholder
would be allowed to invade the sphere of another.
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and by princes and officials without question, probably until the time of
Ceasar."76 Professor Pugh suggested Holmes himself viewed historical
experience as playing the key role in prolonging the legitimation of the
immunity concept:
The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many
centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and
corollaries of a book of mathematics .... The substance of the law at any
given time... corresponds... with what is then understood to be conve-
nient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to
work out desired results, depend very much upon its past.77
This suspicion was reaffirmed and driven home during the "realist chal-
lenge," an attack on stare decisis and the circularity of formalistic rights
theory. 8
Holmes' reasoning forms the final link in an orbicular search, a jour-
ney beginning and ending with conceptions of authoritative power which
elude adequate explanation. Divine revelation, fiscal necessity, and scien-
tific-legal reasoning provide little more than an understanding of the mis-
understandings inherent in any search for sovereign immunity's true
genesis. Dogmatism rooted in supreme power is the only prevailing
current.
In the Nuclear Age, atomic weapons operate to preserve the pre-
existing relationship between sovereign power and war. Author Jonathan
Schell has commented on the sovereignty-war fusion:
It was into the sovereignty system that nuclear bombs were born .... One
might say they appeared in the world in military disguise, for it has been
traditional military thinking, itself an inseparable part of the system of
traditional political thinking . . ., that has provided . . . international
goals-namely, national interests .... The machine produces certain things
that its users want-in this case, national sovereignty-and an unhappy
76. A. MARTIN, supra note 53, at 18; cf supra note 30 (referring to possible Roman origins).
77. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1, (Howe ed. 1963) (originally published in 1881). Profes-
sor Pugh construed the opening passages of The Common Law as Holmes' way of bending back his
logical-scientific justification for sovereign immunity. "The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience." Id., cited in Pugh, supra note 31, at 492.
78. Traditionally, legal discourse had justified decisions by making reference to rights; an
opinion, for example, would set out as a reason for finding the defendant liable that she
had invaded the property rights of the plaintiff.... Yet, as the realists pointed out, such
justifications are inevitably circular. There will be a right if, and only if, the court finds
for the plaintiff.... What the court cites as a reason for the decision-the existence of a
right-is in fact, only the result.
Mensch, supra note 61, at 27; cf text accompanying note 71 (quoting Holmes in Kawananahoa v.
Polyblank).
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side effect extinguishes the species.7 9
Thus, sovereign immunity, a prerogative of sovereign power, lies within
the broader context of a political collective's desire to maintain autono-
mous existence in the global order.
While the means of maintaining national autonomy changed greatly
during this century due to technology, analogistic legal reasoning, a
static thinking process, propelled unaltered immunity concepts forward.
According to Roscoe Pound, "Reason and [legal] reasoning are not the
same thing. Reasoning as such does not always and necessarily lead to
reasonable results. Nor is it necessarily guided by reason. It proceeds
upon analogies."' Therefore, legitimizing twentieth century immunity
requires an attempt to reconcile explanations rooted in earlier centuries
with those influenced by growing ultranationalism. The changing condi-
tion of our world dooms any such reconciliation to failure.
For example, Pound, searching for a means to world peace in the
void between nationalistic identities, cited two stumbling blocks to a uni-
versal international law-juristic thinking controlled by historical analo-
gies, and the subsidiary conception of law as a glorified policing
mechanism subject to abuse by the powerful."1 Schemes to achieve inter-
national political order, such as the League of Nations and the United
Nations, 2 indicate a recognition that, although the physical distance be-
tween nations remains the same, advances in technology make the world
a smaller place. Yet "the theory of sovereignty will not down; it persists
and is still practiced by reason of the innate and insatiable quality of all
governments... to reach out for power." 3 Thus, sovereign immunity
can no longer be justified solely on the ground of maintaining effective,
internal government. The concept came to reflect the nation's position in
the global-political order, a stance dictated primarily by military policy.
This development is outlined below.
Life in the new republic began, in analogistic terms, with the "per-
fect state" dispensing unchallengeable justice. The necessity of establish-
ing self-governing stability overrode isolated instances of injustice. The
army born into the democracy 4 came to reflect a division "between the
79. J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH 187 (1982).
80. Pound, The Tort Claims Act: Reason or History? 37 TUL. L. REV. 685, 690-91 (1963).
81. Id. at 686.
82. Plans for universal political order had been drawn as early as the seventeenth century. See
id.
83. Edmunds, The Laws of War: Their Rise in the Nineteenth Century and Their Collapse in the
Twentieth, 15 VIRG. L. REv. 321, 325 (1929).
84. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I & 12-15.
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soldier and civilian;.., a separate military profession '8 5 creating oppor-
tunities for peaceful industry, trade, and cultural pursuits in civilian
life."6 War was no longer "a condition in which every man, woman and
child of the belligerent state is the personal enemy of every man, woman,
and and child in the other, but a contest between states, to be carried out
by public armed forces....
Increasing civilian-industrial productivity paralleled the dev~elop-
ment of the professional military. In time, the divisive tragedy of the
Civil War would usher in the "dawn of a new era of deference to the
civilian .... 88 However, internal bloodshed extended the state irrespon-
sibility analogy under the auspice of effective governmental administra-
tion.8 9 The resulting tension caused the doctrine's axiomatic roots to be
questioned by the judiciary.9"
In time, political focus shifted towards the encroaching outside
world. Official codes for international warfare developed, 91 treating the
military as an organized profession amidst the development of military
machines capable of lethal intrusions into civilian spheres. Civilians were
viewed as detached from hostile action, blameless with regard to battle-
field atrocities, and, above all, were to be protected from physical harm.92
Unfortunately, the tendency among the powerful to abuse laws
crossed international boundaries in the twentieth century. In the context
of technological advances, attempts to "humanize" warfare gave way to
two fundamental military doctrines placing hostile action above the law.
The first, military necessity, "is one of the corollaries of sovereignty" 93
which elevates the preservation of internal law above any duty to protect
against an aggressive nation. Reprisal, the second doctrine, is a "war
right which releases one belligerent from the supposed obligations of law,
85. 1 H. BUCKLE, THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN ENGLAND 149 (1922), quoted in Ed-
munds, supra note 83, at 326.
86. Many of these liberties were actually enjoyed by few until after the Civil War. See Edmunds,
supra note 83, at 326-29.
87. Id. at 327.
88. Edmunds, supra note 83, at 328.
89. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
91. On the early development of international war rules, see Edmunds, supra note 83, at 329-34.
92. "We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of
sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this
war." Address of President Woodrow Wilson to Congress (Apr. 2, 1917) quoted in id. at 332.
93. Id. at 334-35. United States cold war policies replicate this phenomenon; see, eg., R.
GARTHOFF, POLICY VERSUs THE LAW: THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY 96-107
(1987)(construing the Reagan Administration's reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty as a loyalty test
for legislators, internally, and a destabilizing force to international relations).
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when the other, even on grounds of Military Necessity, is alleged to have
violated the law."94 The key feature of reprisal is that it is usually carried
out on prisoners of war and civilians-"vicarious victims."9  Thus the
purpose of war rules-protection of civilians-may be ignored during
war under the guise of "military necessity."96
Professor Sterling Edmunds, writing during the post-World War I
era, asserted that the exercise of war rights resulted in an expansion of
internal immunities97-a ramification of external power abuses. With
foresight, he predicted that governments would analogize the legitima-
tion of chemical warfare during World War I to future use of "a projec-
tile capable of destroying an army in one blow." 98 Thus, sovereign
immunity is inseparable from international power struggles, and can be
expanded during wartime to quash liberties.99
At the end of World War II, America was thrust into cold war and
maintained economic stability, in part, through the production of war-
waging devices." Military intrusions into basic human liberties did not
94. Edmunds, supra note 83, at 335. A hostile derivative of "two wrongs make a right" type
thinking. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could be viewed as reprisal for the Japa-
nese attack on Peal Harbor.
95. Id. at 336.
96. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
97. During World War I these abuses included: (1) compulsory military service; (2) governmen-
tal manipulation of the press; (3) complete destruction of the civilian/soldier spheres, placing even
children in danger as producers of war products; and (4) govermental control over societal resources,
from heavy industry to food. See Edmunds, supra note 83, at 338-39. For an interesting analysis of
sovereign immunity's extention into the international marketplace following World War I, cf An-
gell, Sovereign Immunity-The Modern Trend, 35 YALE L.J. 150 (1925).
98. J. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 77 (1911), quoted and construed in Edmunds, supra
note 83, at 342.
99. The power of the mass media in masking governmental intrusions and quickly shaping per-
spectives cannot be understated. On the power of television specifically, see J. ELLUL, supra note 15,
at 175-78.
100. President Eisenhower warned of this force - the military-industrial complex - in his
farewell address to the American people:
The potential for the disasterous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
... Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the
huge industrial and military machines of defense with the our peaceful methods and
goals ....
... [Tihe free university, historically the foundation of free ideas and scientific discov-
ery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. [A] governmental contract
becomes... virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity.
... [W]e must now be alert to the... danger that public policy could itself become
the captive of a scientific-technological elite.
Address by Dwight D. Eisenhower (Jan. 17, 1961), reprinted in THE MILITARY AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY 61 (S. Ambrose & J. Barber ed. 1972).
On the increasing rise of the industrial military complex, see generally H. MOSLEY, THE ARMS
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recede, however, as evidenced by the tragedies resulting from atomic
testing on American soil. The maintenance of national security caused
citizens to remain passive in the face of unjust activity. Historical analo-
gizing led to outright self-destruction. However, in the event of a future
atomic war, the intangible higher force governments once used to legiti-
mize their acts will disappear entirely. The king's soldiers fought under
their God and American soldiers unselfishly laid down their lives for the
will of the people. What will combatants in the next world war be fight-
ing for, given that the very existence of our world could be obliterated in
an instant?
War seems to be an inevitable tragedy of the human condition. Gov-
ernments inevitably instill nationalistic identity in their people, creating a
sense of security. Yet in today's world, the bomb often serves as the
supreme protector of this nationalism, preserving nationalistic autonomy
through worldwide distrust and anxiety. Mythical security exists where
governments are compelled to create euphemisms for means of utter de-
struction (the MX missile, for example, is labeled the "Peacekeeper")101
in order to prevent national paralysis.
In systematic fashion, pressure by citizens injured by militant poli-
cies is subordinated to fear of outside forces perceived as aggressors.
Hence, ill-conceived legalistic analogies flow from judicial, administra-
tive, executive, and legislative bodies to quash internal strife potentially
injurious to national security policies. To demonstrate that national au-
tonomy in the Atomic Age has been built upon bureaucratic manipula-
tion of the citizenry's mindset, the following section addresses post-
World War II treatment of Japanese and Japanese-Americans, when pas-
sions were inflamed and subject to influence. Abandonment of victims of
atomic weaponry, as will be demonstrated, is established policy of the
RACE: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES (1985) (a statistical analysis of the military econ-
omy); B. PYADVSHEC, THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX OF THE U.S.A. (a Soviet author's
perspective); THE MILITARY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (S. Ambrose & J. Barber ed. 1972) (offering
essays on numerous topics); THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: A REASSESSMENT (S. Sarke-
sian ed. 1972) (various essays with an emphasis on decision making by governmental elites).
101. Another example is the Strategic Defense Initiative's transformation into "Star Wars." See
address to the nation by President Reagan (Mar. 3, 1983) (reprinted in 19 Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents 442 (Mar. 23, 1983).
Jurists are not immune from propaganda, "Mhe MX missile, afterall, is by some called the
'Peacekeeper.' " United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 450, at 45 (2d Cir. 1985) (Oakes, J.). See J. ELLUL,
supra note 15, at 13-14 (addressing the judiciary as a propaganda tool for both the state and the
defendant). For a comprehensive account of the creation and adoption of an euphamistic language
by our government and atomic weapons producers, see generally S. MILGARTNER, R. BELL & R.
O'CONNOR, NUKESPEAK: THE SELLING OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (Penguin ed.
1983).
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United States of America-a historical trend evincing that "the Bomb
can do no wrong."
III. ABANDONMENT AS A MEANS OF PERCEPTION DISTORTION.
Military training is the education of the mind and body in the technique of
killing. It is education for war. It is the perpetuation of the war mentality. It
thwarts the growth of man's will for peace. 
10 2
Born into the Atomic Age was an unprecedented desire for scientific
secrecy.103 National security heads mandated that technological discov-
eries remain classified. A new era of peacetime deference towards mili-
tary decision makers resulted."° As the cold war brought new fears into
light, l' military information channels played a major role in shaping
American atomic reality.'06 Analysis of events taking place in post-
World War II Japan evinces that the desire for secrecy led to the system-
atic distortion of information."°7 Debates concerning the validity of mili-
tary assertions offered in that era continue today.
0 8
102. EINSTEIN ON PEACE 113 (0. Nathan & H. Norden ed. 1960) (reprinted translation of The
Manifesto of the Joint Peace Council, released on October 12, 1930).
103. [Ior a long time [scientists] had a dream of how the scientific pursuit of truth
would result in bringing together men of different races and nations. Science spoke a
common language.... Somehow they failed to note that their assistance, at all stages of
history, had always been called in by the war maker... But [creation of the atomic
bomb] ... involved... [them] in a most terrible and spectacular act of war... for which
the utmost secrecy had been imposed.
D. RUSSELL, THE RELIGION OF THE MACHINE AGE 208 (1983).
104. Since World War II, the process of Secrecy-the readiness to invoke "national se-
curity"-has been a pillar of the nuclear establishment....
The net effect is to stifle debate about the fundamentals of nuclear policy. Concerned
citizens dare not ask certain questions, and [others] ... feel that these are matters which
only a few initiated experts are entitled to discuss. This self-imposed restraint only en-
trenches further those who are committed to the nuclear arms race.
Morland, The H-bomb Secret: To Know How is to Ask Why, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 23.
105. Until World War II, Americans were able to "view peace as the normal state of affairs, ...
war was an aberration." Barber, The Military Services and American Society: Relationships and Atti-
tudes, in THE MILITARY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 301 (S. Ambrose & J. Barber ed. 1972). In the
technological age, however, the oceans, which offered the opportunity to pick and choose wars,
where quickly crossed, as Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima demonstrated.
106. See J. ELLUL, supra note 15, at 45-46 (suggesting governmental information is more influ-
ential where a threat of imminent war exists).
107. Id. at 52-61 (addressing the acceptance of inaccurate information as "truth" due to the
inability to personally verify such information).
108. See, eg., House Hearings, supra note 2 (addressing conflicts between governmental and
independent researchers on the effects radiation produces on the human form). The government's
position is difficult to disprove, given its ability to conceal prejudicial data under the auspice of "top
secret" informaiion. See also infra notes 117-127 and accompanying text (addressing the conceal-
ment of radiation's deadly effects in post-World War II Japan).
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Only in recent years have victims of bomb-generated radiation be-
gun to remove the "informational shadows" cast by 235 atmospheric det-
onations of nuclear weapons.10 9 Unfortunately, the progeny of such
,,tests,,, the ongoing development of more advanced weapons systems,
focuses worldwide attention away from human suffering towards topics
such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and questions surrounding
its utility as a defensive weapon."1 ' In addition, victims confront inaccu-
rate popular conceptions of nuclear radiation's effects, notions developed
during forty years of military informational gatekeeping. Provided below
is an overview of post-World War II factual manipulations which aided
in the creation of the current victims' crisis and the atomic-military
mindset.
The Japanese term hibakusha (literally "A-bomb received person")
is now used to designate all victims of nuclear radiation. The dominant
rationale for abandoning these persons is that governmentally-provided
medical treatment would be an insurmountable financial burden.112 An
analysis of current American policies towards the hibakusha, however,
suggests that they continue to serve as subjects in an ongoing forty-year
old medical experiment. Information thereby gained is valuable to both
medical science and military strategists intent upon winning a nuclear
war. 13 In addition, research on the aftereffects of radiation exposure re-
109. See supra note 2.
110. Some believe the atomic bombings of Hiroshim and Nagasaki were the result of a policy
aimed at testing the aftereffects of atomic weaponry. In July of 1945, both cities were embargoed
against conventional air attacks. Kamata and Salaff, The Atomic Bomb and Citizens of Nagasaki,
BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS, Apr.-June 1982, at 41 (asserting the embargoes were
designed to facilitate surveys of physical destruction).
111. According to Robert Bowman, President of the Institute for Space and Securities Studies,
"Star Wars" exacerbates the threat of a disarming first strike attack by the United States, for the
weapon is "much more effective against retaliatory strikes than aggressive ones." R. BOWMAN, STAR
WARS: DEFENSE OR DEATH STAR? 60 (1985); see M. I.AKu & D. AXELROD, To WIN A NUCLEAR
WAR 239-60 (1987) [hereinafter To WIN] (addressing the system's unfeasibility, military public rela-
tions projects aimed at the project, and the resultant stimulation of the nuclear arms race). Contra
Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" speech of Mar. 23, 1983 (reprinted in R. BOWMAN, supra, at 106)
(Reagan claimed "Star Wars" would render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete").
112. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 109 (prepared statement of Donald Ivers, General Coun-
sel of the Veterans' Administration, estimating the cost of a comprehensive relief plan for atomic
veterans at $23 billion). Contra id. at 2 (statement of Hon Douglas Applegate) (referring to a Con-
gressional Budget Office report which estimated the program's cost at $94 million, Applegate stated,
"I think the Veterans' Administration... is being facetious."); cf infra note 415 (addressing passage
of Atomic veterans legislation in 1988).
113. See generally To WIN, supra note 111, at 175-272 (authors asserting the United States has
abandoned the deterrent theory of Mutually Assured Destruction and presently gear efforts towards




suited in other inhumane experiments with nuclear weaponry. 114
Before addressing problems confronted by Japanese victims specifi-
cally, four other groups of hibakusha which have been hidden from the
attention of the American people, deserve recognition: (1) Japanese-
Americans present in either Hiroshima or Nagasaki during the 1945
bombings, (2) United States service personnel (atomic veterans) exposed
to dangerous levels of radiation in the Occupation Force's cleanup opera-
tions or subsequent atmospheric detonations of nuclear weapons,"- (3)
American civilians living downwind from test sites in the continental
United States (downwinders), and (4) children of the above groups suf-
fering from birth defects due to a parent's exposure to radiation. When
assessed in the context of evergrowing militarized nationalism, proposed
decreases in governmental intervention into competition among weapons
producers," 6 and foreign policies shaped by proponents of SDI technol-
ogy, the difficulties facing these groups in their fight for relief is magni-
fied. However, their battle, unlike that fought by Japanese victims, is not
hindered by post-war animosity and geographical distance.
A. Japanese Hibakusha
Japan surrendered to Allied forces on August 14, 1945, fearing that
the United States possessed a stockpile of atomic bombs. Immediately
thereafter, military elites in Washington, D.C. decided to stress only the
incredible destructive power of the bomb, shifting attention away from
its devastating effects upon humans.'
7
The Occupation Press Corps, a band of American journalists hand-
picked by military officials, were the first foreign reporters allowed into
the ravaged cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki."' Beginning on Septem-
ber 3rd, high-level public relations officers began to lead the curious writ-
ers through Hiroshima's ruins, directing attention towards the 68,000
crumbled buildings and away from Red Cross hospitals overflowing with
114. See, ag., infra note 194 (addressing the military's claim, during the 1940's, that animal
participation in atomic bomb tests were helpful to medical science).
115. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 7 (statement of Representative G.V. Montgomery, Chair-
man of the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs).
116. See A QUEST FOR EXCELLENCE: FINAL REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S BLUE RIBBON
COMM. ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT 13-15 (1986). The Commission, advocating a laissez faire ap-
proach to weapons development, was formed pursuant to a 1984 congressional mandate. See Depart-
ment of Defense Authorization Act of 1985, Pun. L. No. 98-525, § 1632(a), 98 Stat. 2646, 2647-648
(1984).
117. W. BURCHETT, SHADOWS OF HIROSHIMA 42 (1983).
118. Id. at 15-16.
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radiation victims."19
Reports produced by these journalists were mere regurgitations of
military press releases. The diluted nature of the articles is evident in one
written by Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter William L. Laurence, who
also served as chief public relations officer for the Manhattan Project.
Laurence wrote that the number of Japanese people who died from radia-
tion was "very small," adding, "While many people were killed, many
lives were saved, particularly American lives. It ended the war
sooner." 1
20
The reports of Japanese journalists posed a threat to the military's
attempt to bury the true extent of human suffering under the rubble of
fallen structures. Major Japanese newspapers were forced to suspend
publication and a harsh press code was implemented, in part, to halt the
dissemination of information concerning the status of the hibakusha. The
code's contradictory clauses required news to be reported "strictly ac-
cording to the truth," but banned any news that would "promote hatred
or disbelief in Allied Forces."'
121
Strict controls on publication soon extended to the Japanese medical
community,122 which prayed that the bomb's developers possessed treat-
ments to aid the survivors. Their hopes were sorely misguided, for even
scientists participating in the Manhattan Project did not expect tens of
thousands to die in the ensuing months from essentially untreatable radi-
ation poisoning.1
23
A Japanese-U.S. Joint Commission for the investigation of A-bomb
medical effects began conducting studies in September of 1945. Approxi-
mately one month earlier, members of the Manhattan Project team who
participated in the studies were told by General Leslie Groves, director
of the $2 billion project, that Japanese radio broadcasts reporting the
devastating aftereffects of the bombs were nothing more than a "hoax'or
propaganda."' 24 The Project's chief radiation expert said the complaints
"'were definitely a hoax because the data which the Japanese gave did
not correspond to any evidence known here.' "125
119. See P. WYDEN, DAY ONE: BEFORE HIROSHIMA AND AFTER 273 (1984).
120. Laurence, US. Bomb site Belies Tokyo Tales, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1945 at 1 (quoting U.S.
Army General Graves).
121. W. BURCHETT, supra note 117, at 46; cf. J. ELLULSUpra note 15, at 102-05 (addressing the
use of the mass media as a propaganda tool).
122. See W. BURCHETr, supra note 117, at 46.
123. P. WYDEN, supra note 119, at 18-19.
124. Id. at 18.
125. Id at 18-19. The United States had subjected humans to atomic radiation prior to the
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The Commission conducted over 13,500 examinations and 217 au-
topsies by the end of its study in late December, 2 6 a study immediately
labeled "Top Secret" by the Counter Intelligence Branch of General
Headquarters. The United States, due to the rapid deterioration of rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, was determined to keep bomb effects data
secret. Fear of both the Soviets and negative American sentiment1 27 led
to the systematic obstruction of relief for the hibakusha.
Public relief was virtually prohibited by Occupation Forces. Victims
suffering from radiation-induced physical weakness were unable to pro-
cure employment. Accompanying the economic destitution was public
ignorance promoted by censorship of the press and suppression of medi-
cal findings. Pious Catholics viewed the disaster as an act of Divine Prov-
idence, and Buddhists asserted that the evil of material beings caused the
onslaught.1 28 The hibakusha were treated as lepers, and many were
forced to congregate in slums where they lived ostracized from society. 129
At this point, the United States embarked on a mission to investi-
gate the long-term medical effects of radiation on humans. President Tru-
man ordered the establishment of the Atomic Bomb Casualty
Commission (ABCC) in November of 1946.130 Soon after the ABCC be-
gan operations the following March, the hibakusha came to realize that
research, not treatment, was ABCC's goal. Individuals entering ABCC
Japanese blasts. See R. MILLER, UNDER THE CLOUD: THE DECADES OF NUCLEAR TESTING 29-38
(1986)(providing an account of pre-Hiroshima testing of an atomic device known as Trinity); see also
T. SAFFER & 0. KELLY, COUNTDOWN ZERO: G.I. VICTIMS OF U.S. ATOMIC TESTING 201-203
(Penguin ed. 1983) [hereinafter COUNTDOWN ZERO] (providing the personal account of a service-
man subjected to pre-Trinity testing of radiation emitting devices and the Veterans' Administration's
denial that such tests took place); 1985 Senate Hearings, infra note 225, at 91-92 (prepared statement
of Dorothy Legarrete, Adm. Dir. of the Nat. Ass. of Radiation Survivors) (discussing human experi-
mentation with street people and mental institution patients both during the Manhattan Project and
after).
126. THE COMM. FOR THE COMPILATION OF MATERIALS ON DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE
ATOMIC BOMBS, HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI: THE PHYSICAL, MEDICAL AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF
THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS 509 (1981) (tr. E. Ishikawa & P. Swain trans.) [hereinafter HIROSHIMA
AND NAGASAKI].
127. Understanding the harsh realities of the A-bomb's latent effects upon humans may have
hindered postwar efforts to develop the hydrogen bomb through continued testing and
experimentation.
128. Kamata and Salaff, supra note 110, at 43-44.
129. See Morris, What Happened to the Survivors of Hiroshima?, Peace News (England), Aug. 7,
1970 at 6. These slums, called baraku, were havens for disease and starvation. Id. On the later
baraku liberation movement, see F. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 78-
123 (1987).
130. W. BURCHETr, supra note 117, at 58; see 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 81-82
(Report filed by the Defense Nuclear Agency concerning ABCC activity). For criticism of ABCC
findings by independent medical researchers, see KILLING OUR OWN, supra note 3, at 144-46.
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facilities as inpatients rarely came out. 131 Japanese physicians were
deeply distressed, for ABCC findings were kept secret and strict prohibi-
tions on independent research forced them to stand idly by as thousands
died in agony.
Independent Japanese research commenced in February of 1952, af-
ter the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. As foreign dominance
came to an end, the hibakusha realized their struggle for medical assist-
ance had only begun. The ABCC continued to operate as a research-
oriented entity, while the Japanese government, preoccupied with estab-
lishing self-governing stability, ignored pleas for aid. The lifting of cen-
sorship led to public awareness of the victims' plight, but governmental
reaction to the citizenry's pressure was limited to planning surveys which
would reflect human suffering in numerical form.
132
Ironically, it was a second atomic tragedy which forced the Japanese
government to stand up and take notice. In March of 1954, a Japanese
trawler, the Lucky Dragon, was showered for six hours by radioactive
ash from the first American hydrogen bomb test in the Pacific.
133
Twenty-two of the vessel's twenty-three crew members fell prey to radia-
tion sickness. The remaining crewman died.
134
The tragic event generated a wave of public interest towards the
hibakusha and against the sluggish Japanese government. Less than one
month later, the Japanese Diet responded to a request for $905,000 in aid
with a grant of $9,783 from contingency funds.
135
United States governmental officials became distressed by Japanese
reports which informed Americans of the Lucky Dragon's fate. ABCC
director, Dr. John Morton, offered to treat the crew at the Japanese
clinic.136 Reaction among members of the Japanese citizenry was hostile.
131. Burchett writes, "Like the Warning posted over the entrance to Dante's Inferno, it was a
case of 'Leave Every Hope Behind You Who Enter Here.'" W. BURCHETr, supra note 117, at 59.
132. HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, supra note 126, at 513; cf. supra text accompanying notes 88-
90 (addressing the limited response of the United States judiciary in the post-Civil War era).
133. The device, known as "Bravo," was a component of the test series Operation Crossroads.
Bravo produced a fifteen megaton (15,000,000 tons of TNT) blast. "A freight train carrying Bravo's
equivalent in TNT would span the North American continent." Ellis, Bikini-A Way of Life Lost, 169
NAT. GEOGRAPHIC MAG. 812, 821 (1986).
134. For an account of the crew's horrific experiences, see R. MILLER, supra note 125, at 188-
194. The cause of the crewman's death was officially listed as "hepatitis." His widow received 2.5
million yen from the United States government as a "token of sympathy of the American govern-
ment and people." Id. at 194.
135. HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, supra note 126, at 543. On the role of private relief organiza-
tions in generating public support for governmental funding, see id. at 563-69.
136. A. CHISHOLM, FACES OF HIROSHIMA 68 (1985).
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Despite an earlier American public relations campaign geared towards
convincing the Japanese that the ABCC did not possess treatment facili-
ties, victims never overcame a sense that they were being used as guinea
pigs. After Morton's offer, many Japanese concluded that the ABCC had
lied about its ability to treat victims all along, and that these crewmen
merely were a means of collecting medical data on the effects of the new
hydrogen bomb.
13 7
As early as 1953, Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review,
expressed concern that the ABCC's refusal to provide treatment was an
American policy designed to mask the horror of atomic bomb injuries
and to delegitimize the anti-nuclear lobby many politicians had labeled
"pro-communist.""13 His idea to bring a group of disfigured, female
hibakusha to America for plastic surgery was met by staunch govern-
mental opposition. The State Department secretly acknowledged that the
women's arrival would generate a wave of damaging publicity, and possi-
bly a demand for American aid.'3 9
The determined Cousins, undaunted by governmental disapproval,
proceeded to transform the Hiroshima Maidens Project into reality. 40
He convinced the governing body of Mount Sinai Hospital to provide the
Maidens with free medical treatment. American Quakers found tempo-
rary homes for the women. General Hull, Commander of the U.S. Air
Force in Japan, promised to provide the Maidens with transportation.
On May 5, 1955, twenty-five Japanese women boarded an Air Force
plane at an airstrip in Iwakuni, Japan. The U.S. State Department sent a
telegram to General Hull, ordering him to cancel the flight. Hull, cogni-
zant of the moral and medical need for this mission, ignored the order.' 4 '
The Maiden's arrival in America provoked widespread attention, as
the State Department had feared; but the horror of the bomb, embodied
in the deformed faces of the young women, was transformed into self-
congratulatory American generosity through the manipulable mass me-
dia. Newspaper headlines such as "They Voice Gratitude," "Express
Friendship for U.S. and Hatred for War-All Costs Being Donated,"
137. See W. BURCHETr, supra note 117, at 60.
138. A. CHISHOLM, supra note 136, at 57, 62.
139. Id. at 64.
140. See id. at 64-65. Use of the term "maidens" reflects a problem still prevalent among many
Japanese hibakusha - the difficulty in finding a spouse due to discrimination and fear. Cf. HIRO-
SHIMA & NAGASAKI, supra note 126, at 420-27 (citing various surveys which conclude marriages
among A-bomb victims more infrequent than among non-victims of comparable age).
141. A. CHISHOLM, supra note 136, at 84.
[Vol. 37
THE BOMB CAN DO NO WRONG
and "Jap Girls to Get New Faces"142 mutated Cousins' humanitarian
objectives into an event reinforcing the image of American altruism.
Crude distortions of reality were not confined to the printed press.
Less than one week after the Maidens' arrival in New York, Rever-
end Tanimoto, Cousins' Japanese counterpart in the project and a key
figure in John Hersey's journalistic masterpiece Hiroshima,143 was lured
onto the television program "This Is Your Life." The format of the show
entailed surprising an unsuspecting individual at a television studio
where his or her life story would be recreated via voices and photos from
the past. It was here where Tanimoto was subjected to the shock of a live
television encounter, before millions of Americans, with Captain Robert
Lewis, assistant pilot in the plane that dropped the bomb on Hiroshima.
After recalling the torment resulting from his bird's-eye view of the
fission reaction, Lewis set a Maidens fumdraising campaign into motion
by presenting the terrified Tanimoto with a personal donation. 144 While
charity to the fallen enemy is a very real phenomenon,141 the "television-
land" version of the hibakusha's plight was devoid of visual reality. Two
Maidens appearing on the program were not permitted to show their
faces, even though ten years had elapsed since the A-bombs
descended. 146
Although most Americans forgot the Maidens shortly after they de-
parted, their return to Japan prompted an upsurge in support for the
hibakusha's cause. On March 31, 1957, the Twenty-Sixth Diet suc-
cumbed to public pressure and passed the A-Bomb Medical Care Law,
which allocated $484,969 in financial aid. 4 Victims covered by the Care
Law became eligible to receive annual checkups, health record books,
and loans for the rehabilitation of households.
Over the past thirty years, the Care Law's initially stringent eligibil-
142. Id. at 92.
143. J. HERSEY, HIROSHIMA (1946).
144. A. CHISHOLM, supra note 136, at 91. For the tragic story of Claude Earthley, a pilot whose
plane sent the "all clear" message to the Enola Gay, see W. Hula, THE HIROSHIMA PILOT (1964)
(Earthley's postwar anti-nuclear sentiments subjected him to involuntary governmental incarcera-
tion in psychiatric institutions).
145. An explanation for this peculiarity may be found in Ellul's theory that technological socie-
ties are comprised of "current events" people, individuals incapable of linking events and complex
ideas together. See J. ELLUL, supra note 15, at 43-48; see also supra note 134 (addressing the provi-
sion of American Funds to the widow of a Lucky Dragon crewmember).
146. A. CHISHOLM, supra note 136, at 90-91. Following the broadcast, the Maidens were stricly
prohibited from "appearing" on television by their Japanese chaperone.
147. HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, supra note 126, at 544.
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ity standards have been relaxed to include a larger number of victims.148
However, the Japanese government has refused to institute a comprehen-
sive relief law to deal with the hibakusha's special needs, such as pensions
for surviving family members, compensation for loss of work due to fati-
gability, and living expenses for the impoverished. 
149
The Japanese courts have been even less sympathetic to the victims'
needs. On December 7, 1963, the Tokyo District Court ruled that the
hibakusha have no right to claim compensation from either the United
States or Japanese governments for damages resulting from atomic
bombs. 150
The State's defense rested upon the distinction between A-bomb vic-
tims having a "right" to compensation due to an official governmental
relationship, military "wartime sacrifices," and "war-related" victims
who fall within the bounds of social security regulation. According to
formalistic conceptions of rights in Japan, there is no right where there is
no remedy.15 1 Subsequent revisions of the Care Law reflect this distinc-
tion by regarding medical allowances as revocable "benefits" rather than
assured rights.
There are an estimated 370,000 hibakusha living in Japan today.
152
While Japanese governmental policies towards the provision of aid have
come a long way since initial postwar neglect, the modicum of medical
treatment provided has proved to be woefully inadequate.
The United States has never allocated any funds for the treatment of
the hibakusha. Until 1974, the ABCC conducted its research with money
provided by American taxpayers. Animosity towards the Commission
was countered by a public relations campaign geared towards procuring
permission for autopsies. 153 The ABCC rationalized its policy by point-
ing out that Japanese doctors would suffer economically, United States
doctors were not licensed to practice medicine in Japan, and Congress
would not approve the funding.1 54 These rationales raise a number of
disturbing questions. For example, to what extent would Japanese doc-
tors have suffered by losing patients who were generally poor and who
received only a small medical care allowance? Moreover, what license
148. See id. at 549-52.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 555.
151. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text; cf id. at 555-58 (addressing Japanese court
rulings relating to A-bomb victims).
152. W. BURCHETr, supra note 117, at 69.
153. See P. WYDEN, supra note 119, at 337.
154. Id.
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gives American physicians the right to conduct autopsies, while at the
same time disallowing them the right to provide medical treatment?
In April of 1975, after nearly thirty years of existence and
$80,000,000 in American funding, the ABCC finally succumbed to nega-
tive Japanese sentiment and closed its doors. 155 While dissolution of an
organization's activity usually accompanies disbandment, America con-
tinues research in Japan today under the auspice of the Radiation Effects
Research Foundation (RERF), a facility co-funded by the U.S. and Japa-
nese governments.
During 1984, the United States allocated $8 million to the RERF to
study the emergence of cancers in persons who were children when the
bombs were dropped. 156 Chromosomal damage among second and third
generation hibakusha is also of interest to researchers. While cooperation
between the countries appears to reflect mutual concern for the
hibakusha, the RERF's development arose in the context of an upsurge
in Japanese militarism.
Following World War II, Japan adopted a "Peace" Constitution at
the insistence of General MacArthur. The document's renunciation of
war17 loses meaning in the face of a steadily progressive, American in-
duced, strategy of rearmament. 58
For many years the United States has advocated the development of
a Japanese military capable of fulfilling missions far beyond the mere
defense of its territory, a territory which has been extended from the
Japanese archipelago to 1,000 nautical miles off its shores. As borders of
defensible territory grow, so does Japan's need for more advanced weap-
155. See, Payments to Individuals Suffering from Effects of Atomic Bomb Explosions: Hearings
on H.R. 8440 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 48 (1978) [hereinafter H.R. 8440].
156. P. WYDEN, supra note 119, at 337.
157. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces,
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the
state will not be recognized.
KENPo art. 9., quoted in Sh~ichi, Japanizing the Constitution, 35 JAPAN Q. 34, 37 (1988).
158. According to a Japanese military affairs correspondent: "[I]n 1981, the Reagan Adminis-
tration came along with its rabid anticommunist, anti-Soviet strategy and put U.S. allies under heavy
pressure to adopt a similar hard line .... Japanese hawks gained momentum from American ones
... and [Prime Minister Nakasone] promptly fell into step with that anti-Soviet hard-liner Ronald




ons systems.15 9 In 1985, the Japanese government exceeded, for the first
time, a statutory ceiling placed upon military spending and announced a
five-year defense buildup program with a budget of $92 billion. 6 The
spending cap was abolished by the Japanese Cabinet on January 24,
1987.161 Japan plans to purchase F-15 interceptor jets, P-3C antisubma-
rine patrol planes, and Aegis anti-aircraft missile systems from American
manufacturers. 62 To keep tabs on Japanese military strength, Ronald
Reagan signed into law a bill requiring United States presidents to place
Japanese defense efforts and achievements under surveillance.' 63 A Japa-
nese journalist has suggested these developments are aimed at decreasing
a growing trade deficit.' 64 However, another reason exists for U.S. inter-
est in increasing Japanese military commitments.
Few Americans realize that prior to deployment, the proposed SDI
requires a tripling of the space shuttle's cargo capacity, the development
of a self-monitoring super computer, and vast technological advances in
satellite and laser technologies. 165 The Japanese space program, while
presently behind that of the United States, is the most rapidly developing
in the world. Japan launched its last American-made rocket in February
of 1987. By 1992, their National Space Development Agency (NASDA)
plans to introduce a 285 ton satellite-deploying rocket which will push its
creators into international space launch competition with the United
States.1 66 America, intent on stifling Japanese intrusion into an area once
deemed impenetrable against outside, free-world forces (as the steel,
auto, and electronics industries had once been considered) may have cho-
159. These events are a reflection of the military-industrial complex's control over U.S. foreign
policy. See supra note 100 (addressing the military-industrial complex).
160. Kiyofuku, The 1986-1990 Defense Plan: Does it Go Too Far? 33 JAPAN Q. 13 (1986). The
defense budget had been limited to one percent of the gross national product.
New military policies are aided by earlier economic strategies. For example, in the early 1960s,
Japan embarked on a mission to promote research and development among computer producers by
abolishing the application of anti-trust legislation to companies engaged in co-operative research.
The culmination of the plan, as designed, is to produce fifth-generation computers, by 1991, based on
artificial intelligence - the type of "mind" SDI requires. See Skons, The SDI Programe and Inter-
national Research Co-Operation, in STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE:
WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT 279 (1986) [hereinafter WORLD ARMAMENTS].
161. See What Price?, supra note 158, at 251.
162. Kiyokufu, supra note 160, at 16-18.
163. Id. at 15.
164. "[A]lmost all U.S. military transfers are now sales as opposed to grants. The turnabout...
reflects a deliberate decision to promote foreign military sales in response to U.S. international trade
and payment difficulties .... " H. MOSLEY, supra note 100, at 139.
165. J. STEIN, FROM H-BOMB TO STAR WARS 60-77 (1984). See supra note 160 (addressing
possible Future Japanese involvement in the system's development).
166. Japanese Begin New Chapter in Space Program, The Buffalo News, Mar. 1, 1987, at F-16.
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sen compromise over competition. For example, Japan is expected to
purchase a one-quarter interest in the American space station program
by contributing $2 billion towards the project's initial costs.,67
Japan and the United States share much more than an interest in
each other's technological advances. Each is also reluctant to call atten-
tion to the living victims of war efforts. Research in the field of vic-
timology provides evidence of the phenomenon-the rejection of victims
of violence is a universal human reaction derived from the primitive fear
of contamination. 6 ' The result is the abandonment and isolation of the
victim, a tragedy fostering militarism.
For example, in August of 1985, then Japanese Prime Minister
Nakasone Yasuhiro paid the first official visit by a postwar prime minis-
ter to Yasukuni Shrine, a monument founded in 1869 by the Maiji gov-
ernment to commemorate the deaths of all persons who laid down their
lives for god-like emperors.' 69 The event sent shock waves through Ja-
pan, for the shrine lost official status with the postwar constitution,
which mandated formal separation of church and state. 170 Yasuhiro's
call for an upsurge in militarized nationalism was embodied in the clos-
ing line of a speech he delivered at Yasukuni: "A nation must shed any
sense of ignominy and move forward seeking glory."'' At present, how-
ever, the rise in Japanese militarism remains comfortably nestled behind
economic prosperity.
In the United States, Congress has allocated billions of dollars for
"Star Wars" research,' 72 while leaving the Japanese hibakusha without
American aid for over forty years. This policy of abandonment, in the
167. Id. A more recent example of proposed U.S./Japanese military cooperation is the $7 bil-
lion FSX fighter deal, which is viewed by proponents as a means for U.S. industry to gain access to
valuable Japanese technology. Reppert, Deal on Plane will Spark Debate over U.S.-Japan Ties, Fric-
tion, The Buffalo News, Apr. 30, 1989, at A-16.
168. See Symonds, Violence Against Women - The Myth of Masochism, 33 AM. J. OF PSYCHO-
THERAPY 162 (1979).
169. Masumi, A State Visit to Yasukuni Shrine, 33 JAPAN Q. 19, 19-20 (1986); cf. 9:3 NAT.
Assoc. OF ATOMIC VETERANS NEws 3-4 (1987) (newsletter) (discussing the construction of an
atomic veterans' honor roll, at the veterans' own expense, over forty years after many were first
exposed to radiation).
170. See Masumi, supra note 169, at 22.
171. Id. at 23.
172. Funding for SDI is difficult to gauge accurately, for the costs are spread throughout ex-
isting space, laser, and computer research and development programs. In effect, SDI research has
been going on for many years. See "Star Wars" is Already Big Business, The Buffalo News, Nov. 6,
1988, at H-12, col.5 ($16.7 billion directly allocated to star wars research as of 1988). Current esti-
mates for an operable system range between $225 billion and $1 trillion. Skons, The SDI Programe
and International Research Co-operation, in WORLD ARMAMENTS, supra note 165, at 275-76.
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context of escalations in worldwide nuclear armaments, was transplanted
in American soil, as analyses of Japanese-American victims and atomic
veterans will demonstrate.
B. Japanese-American Hibakusha: The Forgotten Few
There are approximately 1,000 survivors of the Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki bombings residing in the United States today.173 These victims,
primarily United States citizens of Japanese ancestry who fled to Japan
during the anti-Japanese hysteria of the 1930s, are suffering from the
physical, psychological, and financial hardships which characterize the
existence of all hibakusha.
174
The physical strength required to emigrate excluded from this group
persons suffering from acute radiation diseases.175 Yet these Americans
experience horror during late middle age, as the latent effects of exposure
to radiation begin to take their toll. While they escape the stigma at-
tached to the grossly deformed, greater susceptibility to diseases and
slower rates of recovery from illness combine with memories of the
atomic holocaust to mar their lives by inducing a preoccupation with
death. 176
American doctors, untrained in hibakusha symptomology, tend to
label these victims hypochondriacs. Their chronic complaining often
leads to a loss of communication with family and friends. Japanese-
American hibakusha face the choice of either becoming ostracized or re-
vealing the truth about their tragic experiences. When the latter alterna-
tive is chosen, their health insurance policies may be canceled. Many
Blue Cross health plans and state insurance laws prohibit recovery for
"war injuries," which include 1945 A-bomb induced afflictions. 177
In March of 1978, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled that foreign
hibakusha from the 1945 bombings are entitled to receive free medical
treatment in Japan. 178 Unfortunately, exorbitant travel and accommoda-
tion expenses render the value of the offered aid insignificant.
The United States government has continually denied any legal re-
173. Survivors Meet to Demand Redress, The Guardian, Oct. 31, 1984, at 4, col. 1 [hereinafter
Survivors].
174. See Salaff, Medical Care for Atomic Bomb Victims in the United States, BULLETIN OF CON-
CERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS, Jan.-Mar. 1980, at 69.
175. See HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, supra note 126, at 117-185 (atomic heat burns are an
example).
176. Salaff, supra note 174, at 69.
177. Id.
178. See HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, supra note 126, at 475.
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sponsibility for these victims. A clause in Article 19 of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty absolves our nation of any financial obligations.
179
The attempts of American hibakusha support groups to stimulate
nationwide concern are hindered by continued postwar animosity, a lack
of funds, and the fact that most victims reside in only one state-Califor-
nia. Funding problems are exemplified by the National Association of
Radiation Survivors, which operated in 1985 with a budget of $25,000
and a paid staff of one.'
Legislative attempts to procure aid have been consistently unsuc-
cessful in Congress. A-bomb survivor bills began to appear in the House
as early as 1972. In 1978, twenty-four representatives introduced a bill
designed to authorize the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to
make payments for medical services to physicians and medical facilities
treating citizens and permanent residents who suffer from physical ill-
nesses directly attributable to the 1945 bombings.18 ' Reimbursement
would be limited to treatment not paid for by insurance or any other
available forms of compensation. Testimony at congressional hearings
pointed out that only 150 Japanese-American hibakusha require continu-
ous medical treatment. 2 Of these individuals, only 130 would qualify
for aid.' A Los Angeles pathologist testified that a $250,000 budget
allocation for the first year would cover all treatments and the program's
establishment costs.'8 4 Community hospitals in California would serve as
treatment centers, so construction of new physical facilities would not be
necessary.
Proponents of A-bomb survivor legislation view the establishment of
a compensation program as the scaffold for a central bank containing
medical information on radiation. The California and American Medical
Associations endorsed the bill, citing potential accidents at nuclear plants
as a serious health hazard to the American public."8 5
The call for a centralized source of information is evidence that the
findings of the ABCC and the RERF have not been adequately dissemi-
nated to the American medical community. In fact, RERF researchers
179. Id. at 554.
180. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 1316-317 (20th ed. 1986).
181. H.R. 8440, supra note 155, at 2-4 (text of the bill).
182. Id. at 20 (testimony of Representative George E. Danielson).
183. Id. at 23 (testimony of the Hon. Norman Y. Mineta).
184. Id. at 31.
185. Id. at 35 (testimony of Samuel Horowitz, former President of the Los Angeles County




were brought to California in 1977 to examine 100 survivors, for Los
Angeles County Medical Association members lacked the expertise to
conduct thorough examinations."8 6 Findings indicated high rates of hy-
pertension, gynecologic surgery, anemia, and breast cancer among female
subjects,1 8 7 but even this evidence did not prevent the expiration of the
legislation. Subsequent bills have met similar fates, even though studies
have demonstrated that twenty-five percent of children born to this survi-
vor group suffer from birth defects and the average life expectancy of the
citizen survivor is fifty-four years-twenty years less than members of
the general population."'
Congresspersons with close ties to the State and Defense Depart-
ments fear that passage of A-bomb survivor legislation will open the
floodgates for war damage claims against the American government.
Even the deaths of most bomb survivors do not quash this fear, for their
progeny live on. Yet Congress allocated $297.6 billion to the United
States military in 1986.189 Thus, many images created in the mid-1940s
remain virtually intact. Defense contractor campaign contributions 190
help to keep the atomic-military mindset alive, while the forty year old
policy of abandonment continues.
IV. ATMOSPHERIC ATOMIC TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES
The people themselves must take the initiative to see that they will never
again be led to slaughter. To expect protection from their government is
folly.
191
The abandonment of Japanese and Japanese-American victims of
atomic attacks continues to be dismissed as an unavoidable, un-
redressable consequence of war. But how does one explain the abandon-
ment of American soldiers subjected to atomic experimentation, where
the image of "enemy" does not apply? This overview of the United
States' atmospheric testing program exposes the paradox of a political
climate in which the state waged war upon its citizenry to safeguard na-
tional security.
186. Salaff, supra note 174, at 69.
187. For a summary of the reoprt, see H.R. 8440, supra note 155, at 66-72.
188. Survivors, supra note 173.
189. Colman & Adams, The U.S. Defense Budget, in WORLD ARMAMENT, supra note 165, at
251. For an economic analysis of the largest peacetime military buildup in history, which occurred
under the Reagan Administration, see id. at 249-61.
190. See E. DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY 71, 96-97 (1984) (addressing the effect campaign
contributions by defense contractors have on military policy).
191. Statement of Albert Einstein (reprinted in COUNTDOWN ZERO, supra note 125, at 300).
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A. A-bomb Monopoly
Initial lack of concern for victims of the Nuclear Age was due, in
part, to an American monopoly over the bomb. President Truman recog-
nized the power that possession of the device offered in the realm of in-
ternational relations.192 In 1946, as Occupation Forces quashed publicity
regarding Japanese suffering, the United States government embarked on
a mission to present the bomb to the American people as an omnipotent
protector. 1
93
Operation Crossroads, a two-blast series of tests in the Bikini Atolls,
provided the perfect forum. Prior to the tests, military officials stressed
humanitarian and self-defensive objectives. The press, grateful to have
been invited to the "show," parroted military claims while virtually ig-
noring the 42,000 ill-informed servicemen who had been ordered to par-
ticipate. These men were given no protective clothing, drank water
filtrated through ships' purification systems contaminated with radioac-
tivity, and received no followup medical examinations. 194
192. See To WIN, supra note 11, at 32-33. Truman threatened to drop the bomb on the Soviets
due to the mutual breakdown of economic agreements made during the war. This marked the first
instance where atomic devices supported the military strategy of escalation dominance, where inter-
national crises are controlled by "threatening to escalate the conflict to a higher level of violence."
Id. at 32; see also M. SHERWIN, A WORLD DESTROYED 165-238 (Vintage ed. 1977) (addressing
postwar diplomacy as threatening the Soviets into submission with the bomb); cf. G. ALPEROVrrZ,
supra note 4, at 236-90 (providing an indepth look at Trumanesque diplomacy).
193. Governmental officials asserted that the bomb ended the war and could prevent future
international conflicts. "The atom should be loved as a peace promoting entity" was the dominant
message.
The shift in emphasis from sheer destruction to peaceful atomic purpose is reflected in the the
drastic differences between a White House press release on the Hiroshima bombing and the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946. On August 6, 1945, Truman stated, "We are now prepared to obliterate more
rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We
shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we
shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war." Statement by President Harry Truman, Aug.
6, 1945, reprinted in THE AMERICAN ATOM 68-70 (1984) [hereinafter AMERICAN ATOM]. At the
time of Truman's speech, America only possessed two more bombs. "[lit is hereby declared to be the
policy of the United States that the development and utilization of atomic energy shall be directed
toward improving the public welfare, increasing the standard of living, strengthening free competi-
tion among private enterprises ... and cementing world peace." [emphasis added] Atomic Energy
ReliefAct of 1946: Hearings on S.1717 Before the Special Senate Comm. on Atomic Energy, -Cong.,
[page] Sess. 1 (1946); see generally H. BALL, JUSTICE DOWNWIND 20-48 (1986)(discussing the
creation of the Atomic Energy Commission and the placing of atomic energy development into
civilian hands); 2 R. HEWLETT & 0. ANDERSON, ATOMIC SHIELD, 1947/1952: A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (1962) (an excellent historical analysis of the
AEC's development).
194. KILLING OUR OWN, supra note 3, at 37-43. Radiation experimentation on animals and the
testing of radiation sensitive devices were stressed by the military as test objectives. Self-defense goals
focused upon the ability of American ships to withstand atomic blasts. Id; see,eg., Atomic Bomb:
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The event was tailor-made for the media, a demonstration of atomic
force against crewless Japanese naval vessels captured during the war-a
reincarnation of the World War II theme of "good versus evil." Even the
removal of Bikini islanders from their tropical, Pacific paradise was
tinged with the theme of American beneficence, as the United States pro-
vided an opportunity for the "friendly brown people"' 9 5 to enter the
Atomic Age. Concern for the immediate and latent suffering experienced
by G.I. participants in Crossroads: Able and Crossroads: Baker sank into
the Pacific,19 6 a not so peaceful place that would erupt with unimaginable
atomic colors over one-hundred more times in the decade to come.1
97
Atomic military solipsism was born,198 but died shortly thereafter.
B. Princely Dreams'99
On August 29, 1949, the Siberian sky filled for the first time with
Soviet generated A-bomb fallout. Five days later an American B-29 col-
lecting rainwater samples detected the deadly debris, sending shockwaves
through the Pentagon. 2" Truman's brief announcement to the public
Greatest Show on Earth, NEWSWEEK, Feb.4, 1946, at 30 (cited in id. at 38); cf. R. MILLER, supra
note 125, at 76-79 (providing logistical background of the two tests).
195. Markwith, Farewell to Bikini, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. July, 1946 at 97, 99. But see
Ellis, .4 Way of Life Lost: Bikini, 169 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. 812 (1986) (addressing problems
related to proposed reinhabitation of the islands, forty years later, due to high concentrations of
deadly cesium 137 in the island's soil and vegitation).
196. On the mistreatment of Operation Crossroads veterans, see KILLING OUR OWN, supra
note 3, at 41-46.
197. One hundred and six atomic tests would eventually be conducted in the Pacific. See id. at
281.
198. While some military advisors claimed Russia would develop atomic capabilities by 1950,
Truman and Congress sided with more "optimistic" estimates ranging between twenty and fifty
years. See M. SHERWIN, supra note 192, at 237. Sherwin writes, "[A] similar kind of arrogance had
led atomic scientists in Germany to underestimate American potential during the war .... [A]s a
result, those who conducted the policy of the United States became too confident.., they could
alone make the 'New World' into one better than the old." Id. at 237-38.
Of further significance to this time period was Operation Sandstone, a three blast series conducted
during 1948 in the Marshall Islands. A doubling of the explosive power of American weaponry
"gave a lift to the politicians, industrialists, generals and scientists pushing for bigger nuclear weap-
ons outlays." KILLING OUR OWN, supra note 3 at 50; see also R. MILLER, supra note 125, at 79-80
(addressing the parallel private upsurge in secrecy surrounding atomic testing, due to fear of commu-
nist spying). Between Operation Sandstone and the early 1950's the United States' atomic arsenal
quadrupled to 200 bombs. This was thought to be enough to wage war upon the Russians. Id.
199. "[A] ruler must never remove his thoughts from military training, and in time of peace he
must labor at it more than in time of war." N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 139 (A. Gilbert trans.
1941).
200. The intensity of this fear multiplied with Mao's rise to power in China. See To WIN, supra
note 111, at 58-59.
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was dispassionate,20 1 but a heated argument concerning development of
the hydrogen bomb brewed in secret quarters of atomic policymakers.
Advocates of the proposed thermonuclear device included physicist
Edward Teller,20 2 Lewis Strauss, and various high-ranking Pentagon offi-
cials. Those who feared the "superbomb" would spell the end of human-
kind included Albert Einstein, physicist Robert Oppenheimer, and
General Douglas MacArthur.2 "3 Truman presided over the controversy.
Einstein, acutely aware of an upsurge in military secrecy and public
anti-communist sentiment, warned that the development of hydrogen de-
vices and the resulting nuclear arms race would concentrate financial
power in the military, militarize youth, place the loyalty of citizens under
governmental scrutiny, stifle independent political thought, and restrict
public knowledge through the dissemination of falsehoods by the me-
dia.2" The Atomic Energy Commission's General Advisory Commit-
tee205 also warned Truman, but the strong anti-communist position of
Strauss2°6 convinced the President to order development of the H-
201. Truman stated on September 23, 1949, "Nearly four years ago I pointed out that 'scientific
opinion appears unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is
based is already known.' "PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S.
TRUMAN 1949, 485 (1964). Three years earlier, Truman remarked to Robert Oppenheimer that the
Soviets would "never" have the bomb. To WIN, supra note 111, at 58.
202. Teller was a key figure in the earlier drive towards the mass production of atomic weapons.
See KILLING OUR OwN, supra note 3, at 50-51. In October of 1987, Teller was publically charged
by the Southern California Federation of Scientists with convincing the Reagan Administration to
embark on the Strategic Defense Initiative by utilizing misleading information regarding the sys-
tem's feasiblitiy. See Scientists Claim H-bomb Creator Misled US. About X-Ray Weapon, The Buf-
falo News, Oct. 22, 1987, at A-10, col.1.
203. All three opponents of the H-bomb reflected the position of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion's General Advisory Committee, viewing the device as an eliminator of civilian populations
rather than a strategic military weapon. For the complete text of the General Advisory Committee's
report, see AMERICAN ATOM, supra note 193, at 120-127. Edward Teller responded to the report,
"[It] just makes me sick." KILLING OUR OwN, supra note 3, at 53.
204. For a reprint of Einstein's statement, see KILLING OUR OWN, supra note 3, at 52. The
factors Einstein outlined may have a direct bearing upon the current state of indifference many
Americans currently express towards nuclear annihilation. On indifference as a human inability to
comprehend extinction, see J. SCHELL, supra note 79, at 139-144.
205. The report addressed the technological feasibility of the device, as well as its enormous
destructive capability. Oppenheimer wrote, "It is clear that use of this weapon would bring about the
destruction of innumerable human lives; it is not a weapon which can be used exclusively for the
destruction of material installations of military or semi-military purposes. It's use therefore carries
... the policy of exterminating civilian populations." See AMERICAN ATOM, supra note 193, at 124.
206. Strauss' position was not only extreme, but illogical. He wrote as premise three of his plea,
"A government of atheists is not likely to be dissuaded from producing the weapon on 'moral'
grounds. ('Reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in
exclusion of religious principle,' G. Washington, September 17, 1796)," reprinted in AMERICAN
ATOM, supra note 193, at 128-29. Whether or not Truman took Strauss' "the 'Father of Our Coun-
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bomb.2" 7 The American public played absolutely no part in the deci-
sion208 which propelled the United States into a cold war nuclear arms
race with the Soviet Union.
try' would do it " argument seriously is unknown, but the hypocritical religious-based concern for
hydrogen bomb development is evident.
Groups of United States citizens viewing religious duty in a different light have attempted to
employ Biblical defenses to governmental sabotage charges flowing from symbolic acts of atomic
weapon system destruction. Common among the groups is a desire to awaken the public to the threat
of global annihilation. Their message is derived from Isaiah, "They shall beat their swords into
plowshares; and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
neither shall they lean war any more." Isaiah 2:4. The activity of "Plowshares" and "Pruning
Hooks" groups does not, by any stretch of the imagination, adversely affect the physical capability of
the United States military to wage atomic war. Even some jurists recognize it is their intent to
commit "symbolic act[s] against... weapons of destruction" as a means of awakening public con-
sciousness. United States v. Kabot, 797 F.2d 580, 595 (8th Cir. 1986) (Bright, J., dissenting); see J.
ELLUL, supra note 13-14 (addressing the judiciary as a "teaching tool" for the state and a spring-
board for the defendant's ideologies). Court majorities, however, refuse to accept their assertion that
"there has arisen a 'national religion of nuclearism .. .in which the bomb is the new source of
salvation.' This 'religion' focus[es] on the 'acceptance of nuclear weapons as sacred objects.' "United
States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 449 (2d Cir. 1985). These groups further assert that secular legislation,
having facial neutrality, establishes this religion, in violation of the First Amendment, by promoting
its existence through sabatoge statutes. See id. at 449-50. In effect, the symbolic destruction of
atomic weaponry is punishable as heretic idol bane. The argument is truly ingenious and difficult for
the courts to handle. For example, in Allen, Judge Oakes merely drew a line between nuclear weapon
opponents, who view bombs as having "no purpose but destruction," and the supporters of nuclear
armament programs who believe the devices maintain peace, "Mhe MX missle, afterall, is by some
called the 'Peacekeeper.' "Allen, 760 F.2d at 450. This tactic reduced the issue of "nuclearism" as
religion to a judicial determination of popular attitude. In essence, judicial reasoning was
subordinated to visions induced by a successful military public relations campaign. Oakes then trans-
formed the establishment issue into one of personal religious experience. He suggested, "It may be
that a person who expounds 'nuclearism' as his religion, consciously worshipping these weapons as
gods of destruction, would be entitled to some protection under the free exercise clause." Id. at 450.
The true issue, the effect of atomic policies on societal life, went unaddressed.
The Supreme Court has recognized that issues concerning national security often result in the
elimination of religious dissenters, civil disobedients, giving rise to political condemnation of some
religions and tacit state approval of "nontroublesome" ones. See West Virginia Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943) (condemning state acts defining orthodox political, reli-
gions, and national behavior). After examining the role nuclear weapons play in the national security
scheme, one could argue that "nuclearism" classifies as a "nontroublesome" religion. Yet, while
personal exercises of "nuclearism" may be protected, governmental mass production and protection
of the religion's idols is not state reverence. Given the court's assertion that majority perceptions
determine what is either political judgment or religious belief, if the majority of Americans began
openly worshipping the bomb, state production of atomic weaponry would violate the establishment
clause. Thus, to eliminate nuclear weapons we should worship them.
207. For additional background into the hydrogen bomb's development, see AMERICAN AToM,
supra note 193, at 132-40; R. MILLER, supra note 125, at 107-18.
208. See KILLING OUR OWN, supra note 3, at 53.
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C. Pogo's Nightmare2" 9
In 1950, Korea erupted into war,210 the leaking of atomic secrets to
the Soviets continued, and Senator Joseph McCarthy began his infamous
witchhunt for Communist traitors. 211 The go-ahead for the H-bomb was
handed down, and Nevada replaced the Pacific Ocean as the military's
primary test site.212
Public objection to mainland testing was virtually nonexistent in the
early 1950s. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) repeatedly assured
downwind residents that the blasts were not dangerous.21 3 The threat, as
emitted through government information channels, was not American
radiation but the Russians and their bomb.
Vigorous anti-Communist sentiment cost Robert Oppenheimer his
security clearance214 and anti-nuclear politicians their offices. 2 ' 5 These
209. "We has met the enemy, and it is us." Statement by Walt Kelly's comic strip character
Pogo, reprinted in CoUNTDowN ZERO, supra note 125, at 109.
210. The Korean War prompted some National Security advisors to push for an atomic war
with the Soviets some time during 1952. See To WIN, supra note 111, at 71. Some congressmen
advocated contaminating Korea with radioactive waste. R. MILLER, supra note 125, at 119.
211. For analyses of McCarthy's influence upon American society, see generally C. BELFRAGE,
THE AMERICAN INQUISITION, 1945-1960 (1973); M. LANDIS, JOSEPH MCCARTHY: THE POLITICS
OF CHAOS (1987); D. OSHINGHY, A. CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE (1983).
212. For factors figuring into the choice of Nevada as a test site and reactions among local
citizens, see H. BALL, supra note 193, at 49-83; KILLING OUR OWN, supra note 3, at 59-67; R.
MILLER, supra note 125, at 80. Central to the move from the Pacific were military desires for secrecy
and low-cost tactical weapons for battlefield use. Id. at 140-42; see also Note, Allen v United States:
Discretion Defined Downwind UTAH L. REV. 435, 436-41 (1985) (discussing the choice of the site
and safety precautions).
213. Governmental manipulation of the media continued. The primary method of stifling public
fear was to disseminate military newsletters to local presses which would print the assertions as
truth. See H. BALL, supra note 193, at 59-61.
214. One of the most shocking ramifications of the "Red Scare" emerged in 1953. Robert Op-
penheimer, scientific director of the Manhattan Project, had his security clearance revoked and his
loyalty to America thrust into the limelight. Oppenheimer had opposed hydrogen bomb develop-
ment. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. Lewis Strauss, who with Edward Teller convinced
Truman to proceed with the H-bomb over humanitarian objection, became Commissioner of the
Atomic Energy Commission.
Many dissenters to atomic war fighting strategies were weeded out of power. Senator Joseph
McCarthy was a "red, white, and blue" American. But see Wisconsin Citizens' Committee on McCar-
thy's Record (1952). Political paranoia gave scientific secrecy paramount status, splintering the nor-
mally cooperative community into fragmented mayhem. See generally AMERICAN ATOM, supra note
193, at 141-75 (providing an inside view of the case through reprints of correspondence between the
AEC and Oppenheimer); P. STERN AND H. GREEN, THE OPPENHEIMER CASE: SECURITY ON
TRIAL (1969) (dealing specifically with the case).
215. Among those politicians losing public support was Senator Glen Taylor. Senator Taylor
was an outspoken opponent of Truman's atomic war fighting ideals, as well as corporate control over
United States nuclear energy policiy. See KILLING OUR OwN, supra note 3, at 55.
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events, in combination with public ignorance of radiation's harmful ef-
fects, fostered an upsurge in corporate influences over the mass produc-
tion of nuclear weapons216 and unhindered military advances toward
development of the "Pentamic" force.
17
On January 27, 1951, test shot Ranger: Able218 marked the first
stateside detonation of an atomic weapon since the Trinity test pushed
America into the Atomic Age in July of 1945. One of the concerns of
researchers was ensuring that the uniforms worn by soldiers would not
burst into flames during atomic battles.2 19 Researchers tested the flam-
mability of uniforms by dressing pigs in Army-issue garb. Because they
were unable to train the hogs to stand on their hind legs for extended
periods of time, they chained the animals behind panes of glass. When
the glass shattered upon atomic detonation, the bloody beasts would rear
up and run around.22°
Measuring radiation at different points from ground zero was a sec-
216. Corporate giants immediately recognized the monetary benefits associated with participa-
tion in America's atomic weapons development program. By 1950, the bomb became a billion-dol-
lar-a-year industry. Former Wall Street banking officials infiltrated the militaristically oriented
Truman administration as secretary of defense, undersecretary of defense, and AEC commissioner.
KILLING OUR OWN, supra note 3, at 55-56; see also To WIN, supra note 111, at 38-40 (addressing
corporate desire to utilize military force to expand influence in foreign markets); see generally R.
BARNET, THE ECONOMY OF DEATH (1969)(developing the "National Security Managers" concept);
S. LENS, THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1970)(emphasizing the labor union element).
Many corporations promoting the mass production of atomic weapons in the 1940s retain strong
links to the Department of Defense. Included in this group are Westinghouse Electric, Du Pont,
Fairchild Industries, and General Electric. Compare KILLING OUR OWN, supra note 3, at 55-56,
with DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 100 COMPANIES RECEIVING THE LARGEST DOLLAR VOLUME OF
PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS: FISCAL YEAR 1985, at 7 (1986). Fifty-nine of the 100 major American
defense contractors were investigated for fraud during the 1980s. NBC News Special: A Trillion for
Defense: What Have We Bought? (Apr. 21, 1987); see also H.R. REP. No 562, Overpricing of Defense
Contracts is Extensive, Expensive, and Avoidable, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 9 (1985) (concluding over $80
billion in noncompetitive defense contracts issued annually result in enormous corporate windfalls).
Criticism of the pluralistic-corporate democratic ideology perpetuates as well, "[IThere are,..
those appointed to enforce regulations they chafed under while in the private sector and who, once in
office, seemed eager to undermine them. These are the Public Service Privateers: appointees from the
business world who carried their Wall Street ethos into the public sector." Stengel, Morality Among
the Supply Siders, TIME, May 25, 1987, at 18.
217. The "Pentamic army, as conceived, would be an elite, yet disposable, force of soldiers who
would fight on atomic battlefields. See infra notes 228-240 and accompanying text.
218. For a detailed, logistical account of the Ranger series, see R. MILLER, supra note 125, at
83-106.
219. One hundred samples of textiles, plastics, and wood were secured at various points from
ground zero. Id. at 85.
220. COUNTDOWN ZERO, supra note 125, at 41-42. Dogs, monkeys, and burros were also used.
Id.; cf Colton, Man's New Servant, The FriendlyAtom, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC MAG., Jan. 1954, at 71.
The public's perception of atomic experimentation on animals differed greatly. The atom, now
"tamed," was portrayed as a miracle worker for modem medicine. Envision a little boy, his dog, and
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ond objective. During Operation Ranger, film badges were placed on
stakes secured in the desert sand. In subsequent tests these rudimentary
measuring devices, known to be inaccurate in the 1950s,221 were placed
on soldiers crouched in trenches dug near the point of detonation. One
a scientist sticking a radiation emitting probe in the animal's eye, "Even a Dog's Life Can Be Made
Happier Trough Atomic Energy's Healing Power." Id at 90 (caption under photo).
221. See CoUrDowN ZERO, supra note 125, at 246-47 (addressing the position of Dr. Karl
Morton, a staff member at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory during the 1950s and 1960s, who
believed film badges were 1000% inaccurate). Moreover, congressional reports relating to radiation's
aftereffects on test participants evince that the true extent of film badge innacuracies may never be
known. Senator Alan Cranston, summarizing a House inquiry into radiation exposure stated,
"[C]onsiderable controversy existed at the time of the tests about the safety of exposure levels and
... much important information regarding the extent of radiation exposure has not been released to
the public until very recently." Veterans' Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) [hereinafter
1979 Senate Hearings]; see generally Effect of Radiation on Human Health - Health Effects of
Ionizing Radiation: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1978) (providing numerous testi-
monial accounts of radiation detection inaccuracies).
At the core of this perplexing problem is the military's refusal to acknowledge film badge inaccu-
racies. The Department of Defense (DoD) compiled exposure data based upon film badge readings
and, where badge readings were unavailable, the DoD reconstructed such readings. See 1983 Senate
Hearings, supra note 5, at 16-37 (prepared statement of Lt. Gen. Harry Griffith, Director of the
Defense Nuclear Agency). The statement reads, in part, "[F]ilm badge doses are available for about
62 percent of the DoD participants in atmospheric tests. For those individuals and units for which
dosimetry is unavailable, ... reconstructed film badge doses are determined ... by [a] methodology
* . .originally developed ... for... Shot Smokey, task force Warrior, participants." Id. at 20.
Griffith continues, "There is no credible data ... showing a correlation between exposure to ex-
tremely low levels of radiation, such as that experienced by the veterans, and any adverse long term
health effects." Id. at 29-30.
The Shot Smokey reconstruction findings Griffith refers to have been criticized by independent
statisticians. For example, Dr. Irwin Bross, Director of the Biostatistics Laboratory at Roswell Park
Memorial Institute for Cancer Research in Buffalo, New York, condemned the VA's adherence to
official (governmental) science data, testifying in the House that the methods of normal (independ-
ent) science, applied to statistical tables cited by the VA as mathematical proof that the test's fallout
resulted in no injuries, evince that over 500 veterans have already died as a result of their participa-
tion in the single test. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 36. For Bross' prepared statement in full, see
Id. at 125-148. Bross, linking Eisenhower's 1955 policy decision to confuse the public by promulgat-
ing the idea that low level radiation was harmless to the reconstruction report, writes:
I believe [the report]... was deliberately fabricated with the express purpose of blocking
compensation claims for the victims of low-level radiation. It is now being used for its
intended purpose. This means you are not up against a difference of opinion, or even an
ignorance of radiation effects. Basically, you are up against the full force and majesty of
the United States government. [T]he ... myth which ... served to protect weapons
testing programs is now being used to balance the federal budget ....
Letter from Irwin Bross to Orville Kelly, reprinted in COUNTDOWN ZERO, supra note 125, at 265-
66; cf R. BERTELL, No IMMEDIATE DANGER (1987) (suggesting AEC and DOE control over re-
search in the area of low-level radiation exposure resulted in lax radiation standards which threaten
the public's health generally).
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soldier often collected radiation readings for an entire unit. 2 2 Of greatest
significance, however, is that the film badges only measured gamma radi-
ation, 2 3 leaving unanswered questions regarding the level of radioactive
material ingested and inhaled by the soldiers.224 Film badge readings
would provide accurate measurements only for participants who did not
breathe during the tests. 2 5
Mock atomic battlefield maneuvers began in November of 1951 with
shot Buster: Dog.2 2 6 Yet radioactive snow and dry fallout hitting citizens
in the northeast after the Ranger series227 were virtually ignored given
the escalations of violence in Korea, and Soviet detonation of a second
atomic device. The atomic battlefield scenario, repeated throughout the
decade, went as follows: "An enemy had landed on the West Coast and
was attacking inland. In defending the country from attack, a decision
222. 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 221, at 3 (statement of Senator Alan Cranston).
223. For an excellent introduction to the various types of radiation and their effects on human
health, see KJLLING OUR OwN, supra note 3, at 270-79. For advanced scientific-medical analysis,
see P. DOLAN & S. GLAsSrONE, THE EFcTs OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1977); see also infra note
249 (providing numerous citations to medical studies conducted on American test victims).
224. Contra 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 101-02. The Defense Nuclear Agency re-
sponded in writing to questions from Senator Alan Simpson, "[F]ilm badge data provide a satisfac-
tory measure of external gamma dose. Gamma is the only form of radiation from external sources
providing a meaningful contribution to vital organ dose in the overwhelming majority of exposures;
thus we feel comfortable in relying on film badge data for these [external] exposures." Id. at 101. A
second response reads, "Although considerable dust was raised by... nuclear blast wave[s], it was
not an internal dose hazard to nuclear test participants.... The closest troops were located several
thousand yards from ground zero." Id. at 102.
The personal experiences of Major Donald H. Anderson suggest the contrary:
Upon detonation we were in trenches 1,000 yards from ground zero. After detonation,
we had to dig our way out of the trenches which had collapsed on us. For about 10 or 15
minutes, I was blinded by the blast .... Then we were told we had to advance foward
from the trenches to a location... [200 to 300 yards from ground zero].
KiLLING OUR OWN, supra note 3, at 90.
225. The inhalation of radioactive dust by Nevada participants is best left to personal accounts.
See, eg., Oversight on Issues Pertaining to Veterans' Exposure to Ionizing Radiation: Hearings before
the Senate Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-27 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Senate
Hearings] (statement of Nevada veteran Lt. Col. Dennis (Ret.)). Dennis states, "[W]e were hit in the
face by radioactive fallout .... This caused us to be covered with sooty radioactive residue. This
dust became embedded in our uniforms and upon our face[s] and head[s], and entire bod[ies]. In my
opinion, we obviously inhaled and ingested radioactive dust." Id. at 24; see also Nick Mazzuco:
Biography of an Atomic Vet (Green Mountain Films 1982) (providing footage of actual tests and the
shaping of one man's opinions towards life through experiences with eighteen atomic tests).
226. For excellent background material into Operation Buster-Jangle, see R. MILLER, supra
note 125, at 119-34.
227. Id. at 90-92. Rochester and Ithaca, New York were especially hard hit. On April 26, 1953,
after Upshot-Knothole:Badger, students at Renssellar Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York, dis-
covered puddles of water over 270,000 times more radioactive than that approved for drinking. Id. at
170-71.
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had been made to use atomic weapons." '22 8 At shot Buster: Dog soldiers
stood more than six miles away at detonation, but immediately "at-
tacked" points within 500 yards of ground zero.
With each passing year the Army's tactical fighters dug in closer
and closer to the blasts.229 In the Pacific, the AEC continued to aid the
Air Force in its search for "superbombs" deployable from the air.
Ground and air forces battled one another for military appropriations.
Today, Congress continues mutual monetary reciprocation while foreign
policy further reinforces the tactical-strategic dichotomy.230
Development of the Pentamic force sent soldiers racing towards
ground zero in trucks and tanks.231 In trenches, service personnel with
their eyes closed could see the skeletal structures of their fellow
solders.232 Helicopters whirled overhead into radioactive clouds.233 Some
witnessed the first firing of an atomic cannon.234
Throughout the tests, "decontamination" entailed a quick once-over
228. Id. at 126.
229. The military vigorously fought and overcame AEC regulations requiring soldiers and civil-
ian personel to be located seven miles from ground zero at the time of detonation. Id. at 126-27. The
Pentagon called the regulation "tactically unrealistic" and moved soldiers within four miles of the
blasts so soldiers could better "exploit the enemy's position." Rediscovering the Past, TIME, July 2,
1979, at 33.
230. The atomic, tactical-strategic dichotomy cemented itself to military decisionmaking
processes in the early 1950s. As early as 1949, Army leaders envisioned the deployment of tactical
atomic weapons to Europe. The Air Force viewed tactical weapons as nonsense. R. MILLER, supra
note 125, at 142.
Recent congressional mandates maintain the dichotomy. The Department of Defense Authoriza-
tion Act of 1985 authorized $50 million for the "construction of facilities necessary to produce the
155-millimeter artillery-fired, atomic projectile" and an additional $1.1 billion for the production of
the battlefield warheads. PUB. L. No. 98-525, § 1653, 98 stat. 2649 (1984). Procurement of the MX
missile was also authorized by the legislation. Id. at § 110, 98 stat. 2492, 2504-507.
It appears that 1950s military thinking has resurfaced 1980s-demonstrating solidification of the
dichotomy. Further evidence is provided by Reagan's signing of the INF treaty. The destruction of
intermediate range missles opens the door to further development of anti-ballistic missile systems,
such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, and fosters artillery projectile development. These two com-
ponents fit into the schema of offensive nuclear war fighting strategies, differing only in the magni-
tude of the destructive force employed. See To WIN, supra note 111, at 173-289 (addressing the shift
in emphasis to first strike capabilities and protracted nuclear war).
231. See, eg., R. MILLER, supra note 125, at 149, 412 (discussing Shot Tumbler-Snapper: Dog,
May 1, 1952).
232. See Nick Mazzucco: Biography of an Atomic Vet (Green Mountain Films 1982).
233. See, e.g., R. MILLER, supra note 125, at 163, 414-15 (Upshot-Knothole: Annie, Mar. 17,
1953).
234. On May 23, 1953, a six year Army project transformed into reality in the form of a 280
millimeter cannon. Id. at 177-82, 420 (during Upshot-Knothole: Grable); cf. supra note 230 (ad-
dressing congressional authorization of 155 millimeter projectile in 1984).
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with a broom.235 Gas masks worn by radiological safety teams were not
issued to troops. 236 To the enlisted man, Nevada was the site of World
War III. To the citizen public, 1950s testing taught how to survive an
atomic war.237
The military's primary objectives in Nevada were to prepare soldiers
psychologically for the anticipated horror of the atomic battlefield, 238
while stifling public concern through well-executed media shows. The
former goal was never truly accomplished, and convincing soldiers they
were privileged to participate in the tests was difficult, as many were
forced to sign "secrecy" agreements. 239 Eventually, the composition of
the tests' fallout was finally recognized for what it truly was-deadly.
In 1954, the Pentamic force temporarily ceased mainland "training"
due to rising concern among Nevada and Utah residents.240 Ranchers
who had lost thousands of sheep demanded answers.241 Yet rather than
refrain from testing altogether, troops were placed on Pacific-bound ships
to experience the hydrogen bomb at sea. Shot Castle: Bravo's 242 fifteen
megaton blast exposed servicemen, Japanese fishermen,243 and nearby is-
235. "Two men with brooms brushed at me from either side. The disloged dust stung my eyes
and burned my nostrils." Statement of a test participant, reprinted in COUNTDOWN ZERO, supra
note 125, at 51-52.
236. The Department of Defense feared stories of masked soldiers would stimulate public
alarm. Id. at 54-55.
237. 1950s testing related articles prove shocking to today's reader. For an excellent example of
a journalistic report parroting governmental disinformation, see Mathews, Nevada Learns to Live
with the Atom, 103 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. 839 (1953). "[F]lash heat and dust passes harmlessly
overhead" of troops in trenches. Id. at 842. A "simple shelter" can save a human's life in an atomic
war. Id. at 848. "Nobody... [in nearby Nevada towns] pays much attention to bomb flashes any-
more," according to one Nevada resident. Id. at 850.
238. See H. ROSENBERG, ATOMIC SOLDIERS 40-41 (1980); see also 1979 Senate Hearings, supra
note 221, at 233 (statement of Charles Joekel, Nat'l Leg. Dir. of the disabled American Veterans).
239. These "agreements" required soldiers to conceal their experiences from all others. Armed
guards attended signings. Violations, some were warned, would result in lifetime sentences in Leav-
enworth Penitentiary. As a result, many soldiers went silently to their graves. See COUNTDOWN
ZERO, supra note 125, at 28-29, 98-99.
240. See generally H. BALL, supra note 193, at 66-72 (addressing sources of these concerns and
combatant governmental public relations measures).
241. Litigation surrounding the "mysterious" sheep deaths took a roller coaster ride into the
1980s amid accusations of AEC fraud. See J. FULLER, THE DAY WE BOMBED UTAH: AMERICA'S
MOST LETHAL SECRET 215-36 (1984); see also Ball, The Problems and Prospects of Fashioning a
Remedy for Radiation Injury Plaintiffs in Federal District Court: Examining Allen v. United States,
UTAH L. REV. 267, 288-292 (1985) (discussing the uncovering of governmental misconception); cf
Bulloch v. Pearson, 768 F.2d 1191 (10th Cir. 1985) (marking the final defeat of the ranchers' claims
due to evocation of the dicretionary function exception).
242. See R. MILLER, supra note 125, at 188-94.
243. See id.; KILLING OUR OWN, supra note 3, at 87-89.
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landers24 to the new deadly force. Animosity towards testing extended
beyond continental limits.
University scientists, medical researchers, and midwest residents
calling for an end to the tests were branded ignorant, hysterical commu-
nists.245 Testing recommenced in 1955 amid brewing, yet geographically
isolated, hostilities.
The independent medical community, rather than governmental re-
searchers who had been collecting data on Japanese bomb victims since
the 1940s,246 tried to provide the public with the information they de-
manded. In 1955, Nobel prize winning physician Dr. Herman Muller
prepared to deliver a paper to the United Nations on the adverse genetic
ramifications of exposure to radiation. The AEC blocked the speech, and
the public was told of the disinformation tactic.247
The following year, Dr. Alice Stewart, a British medical researcher,
linked low-level radiation exposure to cancer in humans.248 While Stew-
art's findings produced little immediate effect,249 the AEC ceased testing
244. For insight into the blast's deadly effects upon nearby islanders, see KILLING OUR OWN,
supra note 3, at 85-87.
245. Id. at 92-94.
246. See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
247. KILLING OUR OWN, supra note 3, at 94-95.
248. For Stewart's study, see Stewart, A Survey of Childhood Malignancies, BRIT. MED. J. 1495
(1958).
249. The potential impact of 1950s foreign medical studies was lessened by geographic distance,
the established societal attitude that radiation was safe, and a lack of funding for independent Amer-
ican research. When research commenced in the United States, the unreliability of governmental
dosimetric data became the primary concern. The AEC intentionally tampered with fallout records
and underestimated dosage statistics derived through governmental studies. See H. BALL, supra note
193, at 107-08.
For example, in the 1960s Dr. Edward Weiss, a researcher for the Public Health Service, con-
cluded a study demonstrating an upsurge in leukemia deaths among Utah residents. The AEC
supressed the findings due to anticipated public animosity towards the nuclear weapons testing pro-
gram. The study finally became public in 1978. See Weiss, Leukemia Mortality in Southern Utah:
1950-1964 (July 14, 1965), cited in H. BALL, The Problems and Prospects of Fashioning a Remedy for
Radiation Injury Plaintiffs in Federal District Court: Examining Allen v. United States, UTAH L.
REv. 267, 282 n.60 (1985) [hereinafter Problems and Prospects]; see id at 281-88 (discussing the
Weiss study and others in the context of AEC disinformation policies); see generally Knapp, Ob-
served Relations Between the Disposition Level of Fresh Fission Products from Nevada Tests and the
Resulting Levels ofI-131 in Fresh Milk (Mar.1, 1963), cited in Problems and Prospects, supra, at 283.
The Knapp study became public in 1978 pursuant to Freedom of Information Act requests. Id. at
284. Independent medical researchers began publishing their findings in the mid 1970s. Initial con-
cern among private institutions for children's health and an upsurge in atomic veterans' pleas for
assistance evolved into governmental studies showing no increases in cancer among test participants
- with the exception of leukemia. See id. at 284-88 (citing and construing Lyon, Klauber, Gardner
& Udall, Childhood Leukemias Associated with Fallout from Nuclear Testing, 300 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 397 (1979) (finding a twofold increase in leukemia among children living in high fallout areas);
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in the midst of a presidential election in which Democratic candidate
Adlai Stevenson drew the limelight by vowing to put an end to atmos-
pheric atomic testing."' 0 Eisenhower won, however, and in 1957 testing
continued in the form of Operation Plumbbob and its twenty-four
shots.'51 Yet the lingering "political fallout" of public dissent operated to
force the AEC to search for an alternative-underground.2 52
Atomic activity came with a vengeance in 1958. During that year
the first accidental detonation of an atomic device occurred outside a
testing area, in a South Carolina resident's front yard.253 A 350,000
square nautical mile area of the Pacific was declared off-limits to com-
mercial ships while twenty-five oceanic tests were conducted.25 a In the
end, sixty-six tests were completed that year. On Halloween Day, a tem-
porary international ban on atmospheric testing was issued. 2 "5 Trick or
treat?2
56
Caldwell, Kelley, Zauk, Falk & Heath, Mortality and Cancer Among Nuclear Test Participants,
1957-1979, 250 J.A.M.A. 620 (1983) (finding no significant increases in cancers other than leuke-
mia)); see also H. BALL, supra note 193, at 107-124 (an excellent discussion of each of the studies and
criticisms).
250. See R. MILLER, supra note 125, at 243-48 (discussing Stevenson's campaign); see also J.
MARTIN, IT SEEMS LIKE ONLY YESTERDAY 141-171 (1986) (providing a personal, inside look at
the Stevenson presidential campaigns).
251. See H. BALL, supra note 193, at 76-81; R. MILLER, supra note 81, at 251-93. See also J.
ELLUL, supra note 15, at 253 (suggesting the use of television as a propaganda tool led to Stevenson's
defeat).
252. Shot Plumbbob:Rainier, September 19, 1957, was unlike earlier underground tests
designed to simulate the movement of water. The Rainier device was placed much deeper in the
earth to test Edward Teller's theory that underground bursts would seal radiation in a tomb of
melted rock. The theory was disproved. See R. MILLER, supra note 125, at 290-91.
253. The bomb detonated 100 yards from three children, creating a 75 foot wide crater. Only
one child was visibly injured from the impact of the blast. Id. at 317-18 (Miller does not refer to
adverse, latent effects caused by radiation exposure).
254. COUNTDOWN ZERO, supra note 125, at 96.
255. In August of 1961, Nikita Khruschev announced the Soviets would recommence atmos-
pheric testing. Less than one month later, the United States military began testing in the Nevada
desert once again. Aside from earth moving or canal digging experiments, all United States atomic
testing has been conducted underground since 1958. See AMERICAN ATOM, supra note 193, at 179-
183. For maps of fallout trajectories from selected tests, see R. MILLER, supra note 125, at 444-72
(app. C).
256. Trick?
With the Soviets orchestrating a major propaganda campaign to get us to declare a mor-
atorium on nuclear testing, it's time to set the record straight on why we need to test
[IiNuclear testing is essential to guarantee that our weapons... actually work ....
Without testing, we couldn't reduce the size and improve the effectiveness of our war-
heads and make them safer, as we have. [W]e must have tests to make sure ... our
deterrent works and that it's safe.
[Me use nuclear tests to design non-nuclear weapons ... so that they can better
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V. ABANDONMENT OF ATOMIC TEST VICTIMS
Imagine what... [the soldier] would say if it turned out that the war was a
game staged to sample observations on his endurance, courage, or
cowardice. 
257
The effects of atomic testing on the victim include premature death
and psychological disorders. The average life expectancy of an atomic
veteran is estimated to be 52 years, over two decades shorter than his
civilian counterpart. 58 For many survivors, the living horror of "Radia-
tion Response Syndrome" 2 9 plagues daily life. A similar response in
those surviving the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been
recognized by author Robert J. Lifton.260 Atomic warfare, regardless of
withstand a Soviet nuclear attack. This increases the chances that our military can sur-
vive and still fight ....
•.. In the early 1960s the Soviets broke ... a 3-year moratorium ... with the most
intensive series of nuclear tests in history. They had been planning all during the morato-
rium for the testing .... and when they were ready, they just violated the moratorium.
... Well, we'd better do something pretty quick. It's starting to rain and the top's down.
Address by President Ronald Reagan to supporters of his administration's defense policies (Sept. 23,
1986), reprinted as Keeping America Strong, Current Policy No. 869 [emphasis added].
Reagan failed to mention that the year the moratorium broke, the United States detonated more
than 90 nuclear weapons, more than in any prior year. For a year to year listing of United States
atomic tests, see KILLING OUR OwN, supra note 3, at 280-81 (app. B). See also Blackaby & Ferm, A
Comprehensive Test Ban and Nuclear explosions in 1985, in WORLD ARMAMENTS, supra note 165, at
115-29 (addressing testing statistics in the context of negotiation breakdown).
257. United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Jonas,
Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, in P. FREUND, EXPERIMENTA-
TION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 3 (1970), cited in Note, United States v. Stanley: A Soldiers'Story of
Injustice, 15 W. ST. U. L. REv. 811, 811 (1988) (authored by Patricia Smith)).
258. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 47 (statement of Reason F. Warheim, Chairman of the
Nat'l Assoc. of Radiation survivors); cf. text accompanying supra note 188 (the average life expec-
tancy of Japanese-American survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is fifty-four years).
259. Radiation Response Syndrome is a collection of obsessions accompanying physical sickness
and a preoccupation with death. Included are: (1) discovering the true extent of exposure; (2) prov-
ing radiation-illness causation; (3) proving the illness exists, which is difficult due to a lack of train-
ing in radiation illness symptomology among American medical practitioners; and (4) convincing
family and the VA that the above are true. Vyner, The Psychological Effects of Ionizing Radiation,
(unpublished psychological study) (conclusions as cited above reprinted in COUNTDOWN ZERO,
supra note 125, at 293-94).
260. See, R. LIFrON, DEATH IN LiFE 479-99 (1967).
Lifton articulates five phenomenologically recognizable stages of survival pursuant to "bodily or
psychic" contact with death. The first stage, "death imprint" is more acute among Japanese victims,
due to the horrific memories created by the instantaneous destruction of large numbers of persons.
However, a "permanent taint of death" and perpetuating "fears of nuclear extermination" are re-
flected in the lives of many atomic veterans. Compare id. at 480 with supra note 259.
Death guilt, stage two, embodies the feeling that one's life was spared at the cost of another. This
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its "wartime necessity" or "national security" labels, leaves no survivors
in its path.
The sad facts outlined thus far have demonstrated propaganda's vic-
tory over veracity. The atomic bomb was ushered into our world as the
'greatest thing in history.'26 Policies of disinformation, designed to por-
tray the bomb as powerful but safe, have been uncovered yet virtually
ignored.262 Atomic devices were tested 121 times in Nevada, where
may be imputed to atomic veterans when they come to realize that many of their co-participants are
deceased - a latent reaction. Moreover, the experiences of atomic veterans outliving offspring born
with congenital birth defects and suffering through numerous miscarriages by their spouses, trage-
dies caused by exposure to radiation, is analogous to the immense guilt and sorrow experienced by
Japanese parents outliving their children. See House Hearings, supra note 2, at 49-50 (prepared state-
ment of atomic veteran Robert Farmer)(offering his tragic experiences of life with his nine children
- each suffering from a different congenital birth defect). According to Lifton, guilt accompanying
inconsistencies in "death timing" is the dreadful essence of this stage. See R. LIFroN, supra at 489-
99 (1967).
Psychic numbing, stage three, is the supression of anxiety and guilt - an emotionless life. To
atomic veterans, psychic numbing was fostered by AEC denials of danger and military "shut up"
agreements which forbade discussing experiences. Psychic numbing enables the victim to mentally
manage existence. See id. at 500-10.
During nurturance and contegion, the fourth stage, the victim becomes an ally to the aggressor's
destructive force while she immerses herself in isolation. Id. at 511-24. One consequence of the
former phenomenon was resentment among Hiroshima survivors over the attention the crew of the
Lucky Dragon received in 1954. Id. at 512. For a discussion of Japanese victim isolationism, see
supra text accompanying notes 128-29. This stage is evidenced by the actions of radiation survivor
groups during the early 1980's:
[Tihe atomic veterans movement [was]... plagued by intergroup rivalry and personality
clashes ... fueled by thinly-veiled anti-communism. NARS [National Association of
Radiation Survivors] was formed by activists frustrated by the National Association of
Atomic Veterans (NAAV), which refused to concern itself with any radiation victims
except soldiers. NAAV also rejected alliances with antinuke and environmental forces
who many regard as potent allies for atomic veterans.
Ensign, Atomic Vets Combat the Coverup, The Guardian, Nov. 13, 1985 at 7, col. 2. The splinterring
effect was due, in part, to the lobbying activities of the NAAV. Because they fight a difficult battle in
Congress, the group may have decided to divorce itself from groups percieved as "radical" in order
to gain support from militaristically minded members of the legislative branch.
Formulation, the final stage, is reflected in the victim's ability to grasp reality, that reality being
assurred death, and combat future injustice. "Beyond medical and economic benefits.., they seek a
sense of world order in which their suffering has been recognized, in which reparative actions by
those responsible can be identified." R. LIFrON, supra, at 525 (1967). Some atomic veterans have
reached the stage of reality recognition. See, eg., Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1276, 1229 (3rd
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982) (seeking to compel the United States government to
warn all test participants of the dangers of radiation exposure).
For a criticism of Lifton's work, see Tadatoshi, Message from Hiroshima, 34 JAPAN Q. 385, 390-
91 (1987).
261. To WIN, supra note 111, at 33 (statement of President Harry Truman).
262. See House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, "The Forgotten Guinea Pigs": A
Report on Health Effects of Low Level Radiation Sustained as a Result of the Nuclear Weapons
Testing Program Conducted by the United States Government, H.R. Doc. No. 65-703, 96th Cong., 2d
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soldiers often served as witnesses.26 3 Others experienced hydrogen bomb
explosions from Pacific islands2" and Navy vessels. Although testing
ceased temporarily, 1961 through 1963 brought 102 additional blasts.265
Since then, testing has continued underground. Nuclear submarines
2 66
and stealth technologies2 67 have been developed. The Strategic Defense
Initiative has already consumed billions of dollars.268 It is in this histori-
cal climate that the following analysis, which emphasizes tort actions
filed by atomic veterans, is offered.
A. The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946
In 1946, as the American public met the "friendly bomb" for the
first time,269 the Federal Tort Claims Act27 (FTCA) was enacted. Alle-
gations of governmental tortfeasance were growing; the primary purpose
of the FTCA was to shift the burden of addressing these private petitions
from Congress to the judiciary.27' Federal district courts were afforded
exclusive jurisdiction and were called upon to determine whether the ac-
tions complained of fell under the remedial rubric of the "law of the
place" where the tort was committed, provided the United States were
Sess. 21-22 (1980). House members concluded that the AEC failed to give adequate warnings to
downwind residents, falsified radiation exposure data, and developed an inadequate radiation detec-
tion program. See also Problems and Prospects, supra note 249, at 228-92 (discussing congressional
unearthings of AEC coverups in the context of civilian claims).
263. See Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1983).
264. For the tragic experiences of Orville Kelly, co-founder of the National Association of
Atomic Veterans, who supervised test participants on a North Pacific island during twenty-two sepa-
rate tests, see COUNTDOWN ZERO, supra note 125, at 87-126.
265. See Gaspard, 713 F.2d at 1099.
266. The United States submarine fleet possesses over 5,500 atomic warheads. Approximately
fifty percent are fireable at any given time. To WIN, supra note 111, at 214-15.
267. Stealth technology, envisioned as rendering missiles and aircraft undetectable to existing
radar systems, would improve the United States' ability to launch a first strike attack on the Soviets.
See id. at 271 (outlining the basic technological concepts of the system).
268. On the proposed "Star Wars" system, see generally id. at 239-260; supra note 172 (address-
ing SDI costs).
269. See supra notes 193-195.
270. Legislative Reorganization (Federal Tort Claims) Act, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 stat. 842 (1946)
(codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402(b), 1504,2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411, 2412,
2671-2680 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
271. Prior to the FTCA, individuals were forced to institute private legislation through Con-
gress for consent to sue. Increases in governmental activity had a parallel effect on the number of
bills, combining with inadequate fact-finding mechanisms to produce inconsistent results. See Holtz-
off, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal Government, in 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
311 (1942); cf. supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (addressing judicially-created inroads to
immunity).
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standing in the shoes of a "private person." '72 Yet the Congressional
mandate to reduce the federal government to civilian status after 150
years of immunity proved virtually meaningless, 273 as thirteen express
exceptions,27 4-- including an elastic discretionary function bar- 27 en-
sured the eventual emasculation of the FTCA. The contradiction of
claiming to waive immunity while at the same time ejecting most suits
out of court gave rise to three situations: (1) individuals were left to bear
the entire burden of their loss; (2) individuals, in rare instances, received
compensation; or (3) groups of unsuccessful claimants sharing common
interests formed collectives and petitioned Congress for relief via political
pressure.276 In essence, the situation was the same prior to enactment of
the FTCA. With an alteration in adjudicative mechanisms, the pressure
272. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1985 & Supp. 1988). In relevant part as follows:
[T]he district courts... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages,... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or ommission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.
273. The process remained politically based. In effect, Congress retained control, stripping the
judiciary of any true power through the discretionary function exception. See Allen v. United States,
816 F.2d 1417, 1424-25 (10th Cir. 1987) (McKay, J., concurring) ("This case dramatically illustrates
that, as interpreted by the Supreme Court .... the FTCA... is largely a false promise in all but
'fender benders.'" See also infra notes 401-05 (discussing the discretionary function exception as
maintaining the status quo of inequitability towards atomic veterans); cf United States v. Stanley,
107 S. Ct. 3054, 3063 (1987) (Scalia, J., for the majority) ("[C]ongressionally uninvited intrusion into
military affairs by the judiciary is inappropriate.") (addressing congressional control over recoveries
for constitutional rights violations under a Bivens analysis).
274. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a-f), (i-h) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
275. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Section 1346 of title 28 does not apply to, "Any claim.., based upon
the exercise or performance of a discretionary fuction or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
The Rehnquist Court, in evoking the discretionary function exception, rejected distinctions based
upon administrative hierarchies, thus an adnministrative body is immune from suit at all levels of
activity. See United States v. S. A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 819-21
(1984). But see Aerea Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35-42 (1953) (applying a discretionary
function bar, yet distinguishing between planning and operational level decision making); see also
James, The Federal Tort Claims Act and the "Discretionary Function" Exception: The Sluggish Re-
treat of an Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L. Re. 184, 189-90 (1957) (construing Dalehite as re-
stricting the discretionary function to planning level decision making). For an excellent analysis of
the "tug of war" between liberal FTCA wording and historically strict judicial construction of con-
gressional consent statutes, see Note, The Nevada Proving Grounds: An Asylum For Sovereign Immu-
nity?, 12 S.W. U. L. REv. 627, 629-33 (1981) [hereinafter Nevada Proving Grounds].
276. The National Association of Atomic Veterans is an outgrowth of this phenomenon. "We
have said all along that the atomic veteran cannot expect to prevail in court. That's why NAAV is
leading the way to winning a political solution." 9:2 National Association of Atomic Veterans News
(newsletter) (Independence, Mo.) 1 (1987).
THE BOMB CAN DO NO WRONG
exerted upon Congress merely changed form. Petitionsz77 meta-
morphisized into lobbyists and special interest congresspersons.
While the number of claims actually addressed undoubtedly in-
creased with judicial involvement, disdain for injustice flourished due to
interpretive dissimilarities between federal district and circuit courts of
appeal 278 attempting to operate within the politically oriented framework
codified by the FTCA. To remedy inconsistencies, the federal judiciary
has recently retreated to evoking the discretionary function exception at
will,279 producing uniformity of result at the cost of reason. Once again,
victims of atomic tortfeasance were especially hard hit. 80
B. The Feres Doctrine
Three years after enactment of the FTCA, the Supreme Court began
defining its purview in relation to intramilitary tort actions. In Brooks v.
United States,281 a case arising from injuries sustained while serviceper-
sons were off-duty, the Court stated, "The statute's terms are clear ....
None [of the exceptions] exclude petitioners' claims. One is for claims
arising in a foreign country. A second excludes claims arising out of com-
bat activities .... It would be absurd to believe that Congress did not
have servicemen in mind ... when the statute was passed." '82 In effect,
off-duty status transformed servicepersons into civilians entitled to relief
in a momentary breakdown of the separate civilian/military spheres.2 83
While Brooks, by its own terms, did not entail a cause of action for
277. The proceedure is similar to that existing in monarchical England. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 35-40.
278. Cf. infra notes 324-70 and accompanying text (discussing various methodologies employed
by federal courts to deny atomic veterans relief). Ironically, the elimination of legislative "caprice"
in Congress' handling of private bills was viewed by some as the "primary purpose" of the FrCA.
See Gerwig, A Decade of Litigation Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 24 TENN. L. Rnv. 301, 301
(1956).
279. The federal government, given judicial evocation of the broadened discretionary function
exception, need not warn the public of the following hazards: radiation, asbestos, unsafe uranium
processing facillities, possible defects in nuclear power plants, dioxin, and unsafe vehicles it offers for
sale. For citations to the post 1985 federal cases holding as above, see Allen v. United States, 816
F.2d 1417, 1423 n. 8 (1987).
280. See infra notes 401-05 and accompanying text.
281. 337 U.S. 49 (1949). Brooks entailed an action by an injured serviceman and the estate of his
deceased brother, also a member of the armed forces, arising out of an auto accident with a negli-
gently driven Army truck while the two men were off-duty. Id. at 50.
282. Id at 51. Justice Murphy, writing for the majority, fashioned the determination on the
FTCA's express mandates and eighteen tort claims bills receiving congressional attention between
1925 and 1935. Sixteen of the prior bills contained an express denial of recovery to service personnel,
but the FrCA, as put by Murphy, "dropped" such exceptions. Id. at 51-52.
283. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
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injuries sustained "incident to service, ''1 84 an interpretive methodology
reflecting post-Civil War judicial justifications for sovereign immunity
was suggested for future use. 85 Parade of horribles dictum warned ser-
vicepersons injured while on duty that any action against the government
would be met with resistance.286
In 1950, the "ugly year ' 287 became even uglier. The FTCA's terms,
in relation to injuries contracted "incident to service," provided "few
guiding materials" to the Court. 88 Justice Jackson, writing for the ma-
jority in Feres v. United States,289 referred to Congress as "author of the
confusion" in rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that relief should be af-
forded subject to subsequent congressional modification of the FrCA.
The Justice alluded to legislative clarification 290 and recognized the
284. Brooks did not specifically define "incident to service," although a close reading of the
opinion suggests its purview encompasses on-duty activity. See infra note 286.
285. The interepretive schema, suggesting congressional intent could be derived from a rem-
edy's fiscal ramifications, was provided, "Interpretation of the.., words may vary, of course, with
the consequences, for those consequences may provide insight for determination of congressional
purpose." Id. at 52. The Brooks' "sliding scale" approach to "incident to service" resembles the fiscal
necessity arguments put forth by the Court in the post-Civil War era. See supra text accompanying
notes 62-63. Thus there was merely a retreat to common law conceptions of sovereign immunity
under the auspice of statutory interpretation. The early origins of this illogical, quasi-political judi-
cial approach are embodied in the following:
Most early-nineteenth-century lawyers... concede[d] that the most immediate, prac-
tical source and definition of law was to be found in positive law-not statutes, which
were feared because of their origin in unpredictable representative assemblies -but the
complex, ancient forms of the English common law .... It was the... technicality of the
common law which ... distinguish[ed] legal reasoning from the "common sense" reason
of the general populous.
Mensch, supra note 63, at 20-21.
286. The government envisages dire consequences . . . . A battle commander's poor
judgement, an army surgeon's slip of the hand, a defective jeep which causes injury, all
would ground tort actions against the United States.... The Government's fears may
have point in reflecting congressional purpose to leave injuries incident to service where
they were, despite literal language... to the contrary. The result may be so outlandish
that even factors we have mentioned would not permit recovery.
Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52-53.
287. See text accompanying notes 210-11.
288. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). But see text accompanying supra note
282.
Feres consolidated three actions originally brought by a former serviceman and the estates of two
others. See Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2nd Cir. 1949) (serviceman killed in nighttime
barracks fire due to defective heater); Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949) (Army
surgeon left thirty inch towel in soldier's abdomen); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.
1949) (alleging death caused by army surgeon's negligence).
289. 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
290. See supra notes 273-77 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs' suggestion.2 91 However, relief was denied and a judicially-
promulgated exception to the FTCA was born.
The Court's interpretation of the FTCA is deceptive, given the con-
text of the times. Suggesting that Congress open the gates to intramilitary
liability during the preliminary stages of the Korean War, stateside
atomic testing, and proposed atomic warfare2 92 is tantamount to shifting
responsibility for evident injustice back to Congress. Moreover, the rea-
sons provided by the Court in support of immunity are vacuous in light
of the facts of the consolidated cases and the acknowledged conception of
the FTCA as the "culmination of a long effort to mitigate unjust conse-
quences of sovereign immunity.
2 93
Four rationales were expressed in Feres to bar, on jurisdictional
grounds, actions for injuries incurred "incident to service," while Brooks
was distinguished as a "wholly different case."' 294 The Court interpreted
the FTCA295 as creating no new causes of action, holding that liability
only exists where parallel private liability can be found.29 6 After inaccu-
rately analogizing the FTCA to England's Crown Proceedings Act of
1947,297 which contains an express intramilitary exception which Con-
gress chose to exclude,298 the Court reasoned that a lack of prior laws
enabling a soldier to sue,2 99 in combination with the lack of private
power to conscript an army comparable in size to that of the federal
government, rendered parallel private liability nonexistent.3 co
The above rationale clings to common law conceptions of absolute
immunity and distorts the focus from what ordinarily would be medical
291. Jackson introduces the opinion with, "[If we misinterpret the Act, at least Congress pos-
sesses a ready remedy." Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
292. For an overview of the time period from a military standpoint, see text accompanying
notes 192-211. See also To WiN, supra note 111, at 71-73 (addressing atomic warfare as envisioned
during the Korean War).
293. Feres, 340 U.S. at 139; see supra note 288 (outlining the fact patterns of the cases consoli-
dated in Feres).
294. Id. at 138 (quoting Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949)).
295. Id. at 140-41 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). See supra note 272.
296. Id. at 141.
297. 10 & 11 Geo. VI, ch. 44 (1947).
298. Id. at § 10, cited in Note, Pushing the Feres Doctrine a Generation Too Far: Recovery for
Genetic Damage to the Children of Servicemembers, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1039, 1047 n. 50 (1983)
(authored by Patricia 0. Jungreis) [hereinafter Jungreis]. See also supra note 282 and accompanying
text (addressing congressional abandonment of the exception).
299. The Court acknowledges that such actions had existed in England. See Feres, 340 U.S. at
141 n.10.
300. Id. at 141-42.
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malpractice and landlord negligence actions in the private sector,30 1 to an
inquiry into the public/private dichotomy expressly forbidden by the
FTCA.30 2 Exclusivity of governmental activity was later rejected by the
Court,30 3 and subsequent reaffirmations of Feres neglect to mention the
rationale's prior existence.3°
A second, but no less convincing, point focused upon the FTCA
provision which mandates the application of state law.305 The Court con-
strued this requirement as unfairly subjecting servicepersons, who could
not freely choose the geographic area in which they were stationed, to
nonuniform state workers' compensation statutes.30 6 Thus the parallel
private liability deficiency was temporarily cast aside, anomolously giv-
ing rise to an employee/employer relationship analogous to private in-
dustry possessing statutory immunity. This "fortuitous circumstance"
justification emphasized equal injustice,307 and was subsequently aban-
doned by the Warren Court in the context of federal inmates' rights:
"[T]hough the government expresses some concern that the nonuniform
right to recover will prejudice prisoners, it nonetheless seems clear that
no recovery would prejudice them even more. 
'308
The third rationale focused upon the "distinctively federal" nature
of the relationship between a serviceperson and the United States govern-
301. The Court countered this argument by stating, "[L]iability assumed by the government,...
is that created by 'all the circumstances,' not that which a few of the circumstances might create."
Feres, 340 U.S. at 142; cf. supra note 61 and accompanying text (addressing judicial usage of self-
evident, illfounded propositions).
302. "[W]here the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant ...." 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982 & Supp. 1988); see supra text accompanying note 273.
303. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955) (holding that government
exclusivity of lighthouse operation does not preclude liability); see also Rayonier, Inc. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957) (no immunity for negligence of National Forest Service while fighting
fire).
304. See Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act -Atomic Tests and the Feres Doctrine, 32 KANSAS
L. REv. 443, 441-43 (1984) (authored by D. Greenwald) [hereinafter Greenwald] (citing as support
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977)); cf Cole v. United States, 755
F.2d 873, 877 (11th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the rationale in the atomic veteran context).
305. Courts are to apply "the law of the place where the act or ommission occurred." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
306. Feres, 340 U.S. 145; cf. Interagency Task Force of Ioninizing Radiation: Report of the
Work Group on Care and Benefits 28-32, reprinted in 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 221, at 430-
34 (discussing the availability of workers' compensation benefit to private industry employees ex-
posed to radiation).
307. The idea that if some will lose, all must lose.
308. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 16-62 (1963), cited in Note, The Cancer Spreads:
Atomic Veterans Powerless in the Aftermath ofFeres v. United States, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 391, 413
n.135 and accompanying text (1984) (authored by Susan Cohen-Klein & Howard Berkower). [here-
inafter Cancer Spreads].
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ment3 °9 Why did being off-duty abolish this relationship in Brooks, but
not in Feres? Secondly, given the "fortuitous circumstance" rationale, an
employee injured outside of working hours by his employer is still enti-
tled to sue in tort. In spite of inconsistencies, this justification has been
reiterated by the Court in various forms.31°
The final justification expressed in Feres to bar actions for injuries
received while on duty concerns the existence of an alternative vehicle for
compensation-the Veterans' Administration (VA).31 Jackson stated
that a lack of money, time, and the difficulty of procuring witnesses
placed the plaintiff soldier at a "peculiar disadvantage" in litigation.31 2
He then transferred focus to the "favorabl[e]" relationship between VA
and workers' compensation benefits.313 In 1977, this unrealistic rationale
was extended by the Court to third party actions,314 despite evidence that
309. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
310. In Feres, the "distinctively federal" relationship rationale served as both subsidiary support
for the "fortuitous circumstance" rationale and a transitional introduction to a forth reason for
denying recovery. See id. at 141-42. In 1977, Chief Justice Burger blurred all distinctions between
"distinctively federal" and "fortuitous circumstance" wording by shifting the former into the latter.
See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977). Commentators ap-
pear split on whether the federal relationship rationale is distinct in and of itself. Compare Comment,
The Feres Doctrine: Will it Survive the Radiation Exposure Cases? 37 MERCER L. REv. 839, 844-45
(1986)[hereinafter Will it Survive?] (no distinction) with Cancer Spreads, supra note 308, at 414 (pro-
viding an excellent criticism of the rationale as a distinct legal entity). I side with the latter interpre-
tation due to the abandonment of the fortuitous circumstance rationale in Muniz and subsequent
Court reaffirmations of Feres citinj the distinctively federal relationship rationale as independent
support. See, eg., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298-99 (1983) (asserting the unique relation-
ship of service members to superiors and adverse effects upon military discipline as distinct). Chap-
pell and subsequent reaffirmations of Feres do, however, give rise to questions as to whether the
Court views a serviceperson's distinct relationship as being with her country, as in Feres, or with
commanding officers in the military discipline context. See, eg., United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S.
52, 57-59 (1985) (heavy emphasis on military discipline); United States v. Johnson, 107 S.Ct. 2063,
2069 (1987). For a comparative analysis of the Shearer and Johnson decisions, see Note, United
States v. Johnson: Expansion of the Feres Doctrine to Include Sericemembers' FTCA Suits Against
Civilian Government Employees, 42 VAND. L. REV. 233 (1989) (authored by Anne R. Riley) [herein-
after Riley].
311. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144-45.
312. Id. at 145. Need a victim of tortious conduct be a soldier to be poor? Jackson mentions in
the very next sentence that some of the intramilitary suits are brought by "widows, surviving chil-
dren," and discharged servicepersons, thus dismissing the lack of time factor to some extent. Id.
313. For an excellent critique of workers' compensation benefits in the mass toxic tort context,
see generally P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUcT: ASBESTOS ON TRIAL (1985).
314. See Stencel v. Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States 431 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1977) (apply-
ing the alternative compensation scheme via analogy to a third party governmental contractor); cf.
United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (a reaffirmation of Feres with a heavy emphasis on
military discipline). Contra Bernott, Fairness and Feres: A Critique of the Presumption of Injustice,
44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 51, 60-62 (1987) [hereinafter Bernott] (discussing circuit courts' interpre-
tations of Shearer as rescinding the alternative compensation rationale).
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nearly one-half of all benefits claims are denied by the VA."' 5 Complicat-
ing this injustice was the reaffirmation of a Civil War era statute's consti-
tutionality, thereby freezing attorney's fees at ten dollars in appeals of VA
determinations. 316  In the mid-1980s, the alternative compensation
scheme rationale was diminished in importance by the Court.317
Unfortunately, attacking Feres internally does not put an end to its
relentless cruelty, nor does it close the door to court-created support. A
fifth and final rationale, the need to maintain military discipline, has
transcended all others in vitality. In a 1954 case, United States v.
Brown,318 Justice Douglas grabbed the notion of military discipline by
the ears and yanked it from Feres' hat.319 The rationale's "magic" discov-
ery was actually Douglas' way of elevating his dissent in Brooks to the
status of precedent under the guise of a novel post-discharge tort the-
ory.320 Douglas, possibly by accident, defeated the claims of future plain-
tiffs whose actions go "directly to the 'management' of the military...
question[ing] basic choices about discipline, supervision and control of a
serviceman.",321 Deeply rooted in separation of powers thinking, the mili-
tary discipline rationale is currently perceived by many jurists and legal
theorists as the sole lifeblood of Feres32 2 -a final, but extremely deep,
315. Of 800,000 claims filed with the VA in 1978, 379,000 were denied. Waiters v. National
Assoc. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 309 (1985).
316. Waiters, 473 U.S. 305 (1985). See 38 U.S.C. § 3404 (c) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
317. See infra notes 321-322.
318. 348 U.S. 110 (1954). Ex-serviceman brought negligence action against government for mis-
application of a tourniquet during surgery six years after discharge.
319. Id. at 112 (citing Feres, 340 U.S. at 146) Douglas claimed "the effects of maintenance of
[FTCA] suits on [military] discipline" was crucial to Feres. Although he cites corresponding page
numbers, the word "discipline" does not appear in the decision.
The military discipline rationale apparently came from United States v. Brooks, a decision re-
versed by the Court. Douglas' dissent in Brooks was simply a one sentence acceptance of the the
lower court's reasoning. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), rev'd sub. nom.
Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
320. By citing military discipline as a keynote of Feres, Douglas focused attention on the ex-
serviceman's break with active duty. The dissenters were set on linking the surgical injury to service
with a "but for" analysis. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. at 113-14. In a nutshell, military disci-
pline acted like a torch, cutting the chain of causation between an on-duty injury and post-discharge
governmental tortfeasance. See supra note 319.
321. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). In Shearer, the Court rejected the fortui-
tous circumstance and administrative compensation scheme rationales as controlling. Id. at 58 n.4.
But see United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2068-69 (1987)(heavy emphasis on the administra-
tive compensation scheme).
322. See Bernott, supra note 314, at 60-62 (asserting that Feres, as currently perceived, is con-
cerned only with military discipline and "management of the military establishment"). But see Riley,
supra note 310, at 236 (asserting that the Court has "silently repudiate[d] the military discipline
analysis" of Shearer). For a critical look at military discipline, suggesting that the military needs no
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last breath.323
C. The "Radiation" of Feres
Applications of Feres to atomic veterans' claims have taken two
routes in federal courts. Jurists either make stabs at deciphering "inci-
dent to service" terminology, 3 4 or apply Feres factors to the existing cir-
cumstances of the case at hand. The latter method evolved in the context
of third party claims, such as those filed by children suffering from birth
defects due to their fathers' exposures to radiation, 325 and actions
brought directly by veterans in post-discharge negligence actions.32 6 Yet
regardless of the analysis employed, judicial distaste for Feres is well
documented.327
In one of the first atomic veterans cases, Jaffee v. United States,328
the plaintiff asserted that the United States government and various AEC
officials intentionally violated his constitutional rights by ordering him to
help from the judiciary to maintain order, see generally, R. SHERILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO
JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO MUSIC (1969).
323. Acknowledging the need for military discipline, the Court has refused to abrogate the Feres
Doctrine, reserving modifications in intramilitary immunity to congressional exercises of plenary
power. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298-300 (1983); see also Bernott, supra note 314, at 55
n.32 (discussing congressional ratification and extention of Feres). United States v. Johnson, 107 S.
Ct. 2063, 2069 (1987) (extending the military discipline rationale to bar suits against civilian govern-
mental employees).
324. The search for a clear, universally applicable definition of "incident to service" surfaces in
the context of active duty injury claims. Federal courts, unable to agree on a meaning, have tradi-
tionally focused on one or more of the following: (1) the nature of the plaintiff's duty status, (2)
available benefits, and (3) and the situs of the injury. See Comment, Solving the Feres Puzzle: A
Proposed.Analytic Framework for "Incident to Service", 15 PAC. L. J. 1181, 1189-93 (1984) (authored
by Michael Gilbert) (providing an excellent critique of the alternative approaches and numerous
citations). Yet in 1987, the Supreme Court moved away from attempts on defining "incident to
service" terminonlogy and focused upon rationales underlying the disallowance of service related
claims. See United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3062-63 (1987) (disallowing recovery to a
serviceman who had been given LSD during military experiments involving the drug).
325. In early radiation exposure litigation, second generation claims were dismissed by exten-
tions of the "incident to service" bar. See eg., Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d129 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982). But see, ag., Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (allowing son and estate of deceased son recovery) rev'd, 715 F. 2d 96 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984). For an excellent analysis of changing judicial perspectives towards
Feres applications to third parties, see Jungreis (Note), supra note 298, at 1060-70.
326. See, e.g., Thornwell v. United States, 471 F.Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979) (covert administra-
tion of. LSD while on-duty, followed by a post-discharge failure to warn); Broudy v. United States,
661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part, 722 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1983) (en bane) (on-duty radiation
exposure, post-discharge failure to warn).
327. See, eg., Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1228 (1982) (majority referring to its
decision as "harsh").
328. 663 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
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stand unprotected near an atomic detonation.329 Proceeding under a Biv-
ens'330 analysis, the Third Circuit held that Feres' concern for military
discipline and the existence of a VA benefits scheme constituted, respec-
tively, a "special factor" warranting judicial hesitation, and an express
congressional declaration of an "equally effective" remedy, thus satisfy-
ing both prongs of Bivens' caveat against remedy creation. 331 The ex-
pressed concern for military discipline is a nonsequitor, given the twenty-
five years which elapsed between Jaffee's exposure to radiation and com-
mencement of the action.332 Moreover, in relation to VA benefits, atomic
vets faced a 99.4 percent denial rate when approaching the VA with radi-
ation-related claims at the time Jaffee was decided.
333
Aside from a proclamation of "harsh[ness]" by the majority, 334 the
redemptive quality of Jaffee as a landmark in atomic veterans litigation
surfaces in a scathing dissent authored by Judge Gibbons.33' The in-
sightful jurist asserted that "[t]hese allegations charge a violation of
human rights on a massive scale."' 336 His attack then focused upon the
majority's overt "irresponsibility" in dismissing a claim based upon mili-
tary conduct that would, if proven, violate no fewer than five interna-
329. Jaffee asserted violation of his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, And Ninth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id. at 1229.
330. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
331. Jaffee, 663 F.2d at 1236-37; see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97 (provides right to recover
against federal agents responsible for federal constitutional rights violations, unless defendant dem-
onstrates "special factors" necessitating judicial hesitation or the existence of a congressionally ap-
proved remedy); cf United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987) (disallowing a serviceman
recovery for injuries stemming from the covert administration of LSD by Army officials and Central
Intelligence Agency agents). For an excellent analysis of Stanley in the context of a breakdown in
Bivens application to servicemen's claims, see Note, United States v. Stanley: a Soldier's Story of
Injustice-An Argument for Establishment of a New Standard for Governmental Liability to Military
Servicemen, 15 W. ST. U. L. RPv. 811 (1988) (authored by Patricia Smith); see also Note, United
States v. Stanley: Has the Supreme Court Gone a Step Too Far?, 90 W. VA. L. REv 473 (1987)
(authored by Andrew P. Doman).
332. See Hinkie v. United States, 524 F.Supp. 277, 282-84 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (asserting that mili-
tary discipline dissipates as a reasonable rationale "decades after" the serviceman's discharge), rev'd
715 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984).
333. See House Hearings, supra note 2, at 12 (statement of Hon. Lane Evans). See also Wicker,
Serving his Country, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1983 at A19, col. 5 (in 1982, only 16 of 2883 claims
approved), cited in Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and the Weapons of War, 29 ST. Louis
U. L. J. 383, 394 (1985).
334. Jaffee, 663 F.2d at 1228.
335. Id. at 1247-68 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Thorough textual treatment of the dissent is war-
ranted, for it stands alone at the circuit court level.
336. Id. at 1248.
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tional laws "against involuntary human experimentation." '337
Gibbons appealed to the court's deference to legislators who were
unwilling to statutorily create new causes of action as supporting "radi-
cal totalitarianism,"338 labeling the military discipline rationale the "au-
tomaton principle" '3 39 and the need for unchecked, aggressive military
decisionmaking the "macho principle." 3" He concluded, "The real but
unarticulated reason for the result is that the availability of a private
remedy for intentional torts will encourage public accountability of the
military, while foreclosing such a remedy will encourage concealment
(the coverup principle)." 34' In essence, Judge Gibbons offers judicial dis-
dain for the progeny of military-industrial complex control, viewing the
Jaffee decision as rejecting established distaste for blind obedience and
ignorant to a tenet of American jurisprudence-military accountability
to civil government.342
The atomic veterans' crisis resembles past injustices which
culminated in judicial abrogation of federal employment status as a
shield to accountability for intentional torts, a rejection of the macho
principle.343 By removing the crisis from the clutch of Feres and traveling
337. Id. at 1249. Judge Gibbons asserted the majority's reasoning sent the following message,
"[U]nder federal or under state law a charge by a serviceman that he was subjected to the intentional
tort of involuntary human experimentation, without legal authority and without military justifica-
tion, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in any court." See also United States v.
Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3065-66 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(analogizing the covert adminis-
tration of LSD by the Army and the CIA to Nazi experimentation during world War II).
338. Id. at 1250.
339. For a historical argument clearly showing rejection of the "automaton principle" in the
United States, see Id. at 1256-62 (providing numerous precedents in support).
340. Id. at 1250. For an excellent argument centering upon personal immunity holdings, rather
than interpretation of the FTCA, as a basis for rejection of the "macho principle's" immunity and
diametric support for military accountability, see Id. at 1250-56.
341. Id. at 1250. For the totalitaristic ramifications flowing from adherence to the "coverup
principle," see supra note 289.
342. It is unfortunately the case that even democratic governments must have military
establishments in order to maintain effective sovereignty. There are, however, numerous
examples of governments democratic in form but totalitarian in fact, because, unlike the
United States, their military establishments have become the embodiment of the national
sovereignty rather than the controlled means whereby democratically chosen civillians
may rule. We have spared that unhappy state in large part because we have always
insisted that the military cannot conceal its activities from review by civil authority. The
courts have played a significant role in maintaining civil control. A decision which elimi-
nates an important means of access to the courts-a means which in some cases may be
the last resort in the face of efforts at concealment-is a major assault upon an important
citadel of American democracy: military accountability to civil government. The deci-
sion embodies a public policy that is affirmatively evil.
Id. at 1270 [emphasis added].
343. "Bivens restored a semblance of rationality." Id. at 1263; see id. at 1250-56.
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through the history of federal employee immunity, as does Gibbons, a
direct correlation forms between current rationales supporting military
irresponsibility and post-Revolutionary War "justifications" fostering
adoption of sovereign immunity in the United States.3" Carrying the ar-
gument one step further, the unconscionable actions of military leaders
responsible for atomic testing become the modern-day counterpart of
monarchical injustices.
The inability of legal theorists to justify the immunity of the King 34
and the United States government 346 results from a hesitance to address
divine revelation and conceptions of collective sovereignty as authoriza-
tion of unjust human action by a higher force offering security.347 While
governmental wrongs fluctuate in form over time, responses are limited
to short-lived, legally "legitimized" rationales. The King became perfect
and the new nation, due to fiscal crises, could do no wrong. In the con-
text of the atomic bomb, the FTCA became the seemingly impenetrable
Feres Doctrine. Moreover, deterioration of Feres rationales resulted in
"discovery" of the discretionary function exception. No matter which
rationale is employed, the results are universal-recovery is subordinated
to the force of order.
In Everett v. United States,3 14 a Bivens claim arising out of the same
test series as Jaffee's was reduced to a mere "exercise in pleading" as an
Ohio District Court held, "[I]t is the suit itself, not the theory of the
cause of action, which implicates the concerns stressed in Feres ....1,349
The keynote of Everett was not the anticipated denial of relief, but
the court's fatally optimistic assertion that an atomic veteran might pre-
vail by alleging two separate torts-an intentional-in-service tort barred
by Feres and a post-discharge negligence action premised upon the gov-
ernment's failure to warn of radiation's deadly aftereffects. 350
344. Compare supra note 340 with supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text (addressing the
notion that congressional consent to sue is a prerequisite to the commission of a tort).
345. See supra notes 30-48 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 49-79 and accompanying text.
347. Cf. supra note 260. Examine Lifton's survival stages in relation to your perception of life in
the atomic world for correlating traits, especially the tendency to avoid pain and fear. Have we all
been "nuked" into inaction?
348. 492 F.Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
349. Id. at 322; cf supra text accompanying notes 328-42 (addressing the Jaffee decision).
350. Id. at 325-26. See also Thornwell v. United States, 471 F.Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979), cert.
denied sub. nom. Laswell v. Weinberger, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983) (holding that a serviceman could
recover for the post-discharge concealment of intentional, on-duty LSD administration). But see
Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (disallowing recovery on the
theory that eleven years of active service subsequent to LSD ingestion pushed the failure to warn
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The in-service intentional/post-discharge negligence theory was sub-
sequently rejected under a Feres analysis by the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in Lombard v. United States.35 1 The Lombard decision relied heavily
upon the Eighth Circuit's holding in Laswell v. Brown352 for justification.
In Laswell, the plaintiff asserted two negligence claims, one based on in-
service exposure to radiation and the second on a post-discharge failure
to warn theory. 3  The court dismissed the action claiming "the failure to
warn and treat after discharge" was barred by Feres because the claims
were "continuations of the same tort. '354 In other words, Feres became a
"rubber band".jurisdictional bar capable of stretching decades into the
future and snapping post-discharge negligence back under its protective
shield. Such continuous tort theories entail equating manifestations of
radiation-induced illnesses with in-service radiation exposure, thereby
abolishing latency periods paralleled by governmental disinformation as
an issue in the action.355 Courts developing a continuous tort analysis
merely toss two separate torts into Feres' concoction and mix them up,
literally ignoring reality under broadening "incident to service"
terminology.
356
The genesis of alleging two separate and distinct negligent acts as a
means of circumventing Feres is found in United States v. Brown,3 57
wherein Justice Douglas announced the military discipline rationale.
Central to this approach is the establishment of an affirmative negligent
act so divorced from the in-service injury that a distinguishable injury
can be found. The atomic veteran can take no solace in this theory,
358
claim back under the Feres bar), dismissal aff'd on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Stanley,
107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987).
351. 690 F.2d 215, 220-26 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court asserted that the FTCA's non-creation of
new causes of action, the existence of an alternative compensation scheme, and the "distinctly fed-
eral" relationship between a soldier and the armed forces were controlling under a Feres analysis. Id.
at 221.
352. 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cerL denied sub nom. Laswell v. Weinberger, 459 U.S. 1210
(1983), cited in Lombard, 690 F.2d at 221.
353. Id. at 263.
354. Id. at 266 (citing Laswell v. Brown, 524 F.Supp. 847, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1981)).
355. See Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussed infra at note 358).
356. Cf. Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act - Atomic Tests and the Feres Doctrine, 32 U.
KANsAs L. REv. 433, 444 (1984) (authored by Douglas Greenwald) (arguing the continuing tort
analysis constitutes the creation of federal tort law).
357. 348 U.S. 110 (1954). See supra notes 318-320 and accompanying text.
358. See, eg., Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981). In Monaco, a Brown
analysis was applied to allegations that the plaintiff's injury was cancer caused by post-discharge
negligence, not merely exposure to radiation. The court treated manifestation periods as evidence
that the injury was "the direct result of his exposure to radiation," thus distinguishing Brown. Id. at
133. "There is no salient difference between a claim for injuries manifest before and injuries manifest
1988/89]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
even though intentional deprivations of information caused fatal diseases
to go untreated in developmental stages, and the FTCA was designed to
waive immunity for both acts and omissions.359 For example, one plain-
tiff alleged a failure to warn pretexed by governmental ignorance of radi-
ation's deadly effects through the time of discharge. This approach
proved distressing to the United States government, for it finally forced
acknowledgment that testing continued despite the known dangers.3 60 In
Broudy v. United States,36' the wife of a former serviceman was allowed
leave to amend a complaint based upon Brown. The Ninth Circuit cited
various continuous tort holdings as grounds for denial of the in-service
injury claim,362 yet asserted that proof of "an independent, post-service
negligent act on the part of the Government" would give rise to an
FTCA action.3 63 Thus recovery would result from ignoring reality, while
a governmental admission that knowledge of testing dangers predated
the participant's exposure would afford Feres protection.
In Molsbergen v. United States,3 4 the Ninth Circuit addressed the
similar complaint of a Nagasaki veteran's widow alleging exposure to
radiation, discovery of radiation hazards subsequent to discharge, and
post-discharge failure to warn. 65 The court allowed the action under
after [discharge].... [I]t would be anomolous for recovery to hinge on a fact as fortuitous as when
an injury becomes apparent." Id.
Anomolous, indeed, is that VA claims adjudication procedures hinged upon such a determination
at the time Monaco wad decided. In cases of chronic illnesses, the VA ordinarily demands a showing
that the disease manifested itself within one year after discharge. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (a)(3)(1985).
But see infra note 415 (addressing a 1988 amendment to VA adjudication procedures which provides
a 30 to 40 year manifestation period for radiation-induced injuries).
359. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
360. See Ensign, Atomic Vets: Feds Admit They Knew of the Dangers, The Guardian, Dec. 11,
1985 at 6, col. 2.
The government's new position is a clever and cynical legal ploy. By admitting its offi-
cials knew of radiation hazards while Broudy was still on active duty, it can now claim
that its duty to warn him is covered ... [by Feres] and hence the case must be dismissed.
Only three years ago, in the Allen case-in which civillians who lived downwind from
the nuclear test site in Nevada won compensation for their cancers-the government
offered numerous expert witnesses who testified, under oath, that they did not know of
fallout hazards during the 1950s. Governmenrt witnesses have offered similar testimony
at other trials and congressional investigations for over 25 years.
The Allen case has subsequently been reversed. See infra notes 405-407 and accompanying text.
361. 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part, 722 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
362. Id. at 128.
363. Id.
364. 757 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1985), dismissed sub nom. In re Consolidated United States At-
mospheric Testing Lit., 616 F.Supp. 759 (D.C.Cal. 1985).
365. Id. at 1080. Ms. Molsbergen also alleged, in the alternative, intentional in-service exposure.
The court allowed the inconsistent averments on liberal pleading grounds. Id. at 1018-19.
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Broudy, dismissing a Feres bar, and proceeded to establish the existence
of a governmental duty to warn via the application of California law as
mandated by the FTCA.366
In Cole v. United States,367 the daughter and widow of a Bikini Atoll
test participant presented the Eleventh Circuit with a similar action al-
leging the decedent's in-service injuries were aggravated when, despite
increasing knowledge of radiation hazards, the government failed to
warn.368 In essence, the breach occurred pursuant to the materialization
of a new and greater duty commencing in the post-discharge era, thus
overcoming continuous tort applications under Feres.3 69 Each Feres ra-
tionale was addressed and rejected in Cole,370 offering a glimmer of hope
to atomic veterans after nearly a decade of consistent defeat.
D. The Rise of the Discretionary Function Exception
While Cole and Molsbergen climbed and descended judicial ladders,
the progeny of a second military tragedy crept into the judicial lime-
light-Agent Orange.371 Shocking similarities between the Agent Orange
and radiation exposure crises include: (1) governmental disinformation
concerning the substances' lethal natures,372 (2) VA stonewalling of
claims,373 (3) lack of adequate military record-keeping of exposure
levels, 374 (4) Feres dismissals of post-discharge failure to warn claims
brought by both servicemen and their children,375 (5) indeterminate la-
tency periods hinging upon unknown levels of exposure and the victims'
366. Id. at 1020-25.
367. 755 F.2d 873 (11th Cir. 1985), dismissed 635 F.Supp. 1185 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
368. Id. at 876-77.
369. "This is not the typical 'continuing tort' case in which a probe of the government's decision
not to warn a serviceman would be appropriate .... " Id. at 878.
370. Id. at 877-80.
371. On the chemical's composition and its uses during the Vietnam War as a defolient, see P.
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 16-20 (1986).
372. Compare text accompanying supra notes 124-125 with M. UHL & T. ENSIGN, GI GUINEA
PIGS 140 (1980) (military officials dismissed complaints pursuant to Agent Orange exposure as "Viet
Cong propaganda").
373. Compare text accompanying infra notes 383-390 with Comment, Agent Orange as a Prob-
lem of Law and Policy, 77 NV. U.L.REv. 48, 55 (1982) (cited in Bennett, supra note 333, at 397
n.109) (only twenty-four of 6164 claims by Agent Orange victims were approved by the VA prior to
1981).
374. Compare supra notes 221-225 and accompanying text with Bennett, supra note 333, at 397-
98 (addressing the military's failure to monitor Agent Orange exposure).
375. Compare supra note 272 and accompanying text with In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 506 F.Supp. 562 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd in part, 508 F.Supp. 1242 (E.D.NY 1984). On recon-
sideration, the children's claims were allowed. Id. at 1246.
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varying physiological characteristics,376 and (6) the evolution of suits
brought directly against corporate producers of the injury-inducing
weapons.3 7 7 The primary difference between the tragedies was the level of
organization among claimants.378
Initial Congressional response to VA denials was limited to passage
of the Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Compensation Standards Act in
1984. 3 11 Under the Act, a VA-appointed committee was ordered to re-
view existing medical evidence and issue corresponding recommenda-
tions for alterations in adjudication procedures.3 0 Relief in this form is
akin to legislative deference to the VA.
381
Regardless of congressional impotence, Agent Orange victims won
on another battlefield in 1984. After six years of litigation, a massive class
action suit brought by 2.4 million Vietnam veterans and their families
was settled out of court with corporate defendants for $180 million dol-
lars.382 Atomic veterans, however, were burdened by the weight of mili-
tary contractor unrest as they continued their battle for relief.
In 1985, VA officials testifying in Congress repeated 1945 govern-
mental stances, dismissing Nagasaki and Hiroshima veterans' claims by
376. Compare supra note 249 with Veterans' Exposure to Agent Orange: Hearings before the
Senate Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1983) (statement of Dr. William
Jacoby, Chief Med. Dir., VA).
377. Compare In re Consolidated Atmospheric Testing Litig., 616 F.Supp. 759 (D.C.Cal. 1985),
aff'd sub. nom. Konizeski v. Livermore Labs, 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 108 S.Ct.
1076 (1988), with In re "Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd in
part, 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
378. The claims of 2.4 million Vietnam veterans and their families were consolidated into one
massive class action suit. P. SCHUCK, supra note 371, at 4-5.
379. PuB. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984). For an excellent overview and criticism of the
Act's provisions, see Note, Atomic Veterans' Tort Claims: The Search for a Tort Remedy Dead Ends
with the Veterans'Administration, 61 NomE DAME L. REV. 819, 832-36 (1986) (authored by Chris-
topher Williams).
380. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 19 (statement of Dr. Hobson providing a confused ex-
plaination of the selection of the committee's members). The Committee has been criticized for its
strict adherence to "official science" and determinations detrimental to the atomic veteran. House
Hearings, supra note 2, at 125-48 (prepared statement of statistician Dr. Irwin D. Bross).
381. While many members of Congress are sensitive to the plight of atomic veterans, especially
Senators Alan Cranston and Paul Simon, proposed relief measures must pay some respect to the
VA's hard line position in order to pass. Therefore, bills introduced limit remedial measures to ad-
justments in VA claims adjudication processes. See, eg., S. 453 & 1002, 100th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1987); see also infra note 415 (addressing passage of such legislation in 1988 amidst a presidential
disclaimer-radiation did not cause any diseases). Under existent VA procedures, former servicemen
suffering from diseases are provided compensation when service causation is established by statutory
presumption or affirmative demonstration. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (1986). Absent special legislation, VA
procedures require chronic diseases to manifest themselves within one year after discharge for exis-
tent presumptions to apply. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(3)(1986).
382. P. SCHUCK, supra note 371, at 5-6.
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asserting that the "rapid decay" of radiation eliminated virtually all
health hazards by the time Occupation forces arrived 383 -one month af-
ter the bombs were detonated. According to a VA medical director, con-
ducting a new study on the long-term health effects of radiation on
atomic veterans was not feasible because it would not lead to any "defi-
nite conclusions." '384 Donald Ivers, VA General Counsel, testified that
revisions in existing claims adjudication procedures were unnecessary,
for regulations were justified by analyses of existing scientific and medical
evidence.385 In other words, existing studies, earlier versions of proposed
research which would provide no definite conclusions, justify the dismis-
sal of more than 99 percent of all radiation-related claims. 386 The VA
also claimed that passage of a comprehensive relief act would cost Amer-
ican taxpayers $23 billion per year,387 a figure 240 times higher than
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates. 88 The CBO proposed that
the program could operate effectively with an annual budget of only $12
million by the year 1990.389 Overall, the VA's stance entailed redressing
"nonexistent injuries" with funds nearly equal to the annual VA
budget.390
Governmental officials told different stories to the federal judiciary,
pursuant to congressional passage of legislation spelling disastrous conse-
quences for atomic veterans. In In re Consolidated United States Atmos-
pheric Testing Litigation,391 forty-three independent actions brought by
atomic veterans and their families against the United States and military
defense contractors were consolidated and tried under the recently en-
acted Warner Amendment. 392 Included in this group was Molsbergen v.
383. Soloman, Nagasaki's Other Victims, 43 PROGRESSIVE 21 (July 1979) at 21; see House Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 15-16 (VA General Counsel David Ivers states, "[W]ith respect to those [ser-
vicepersons] who entered Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the bomb was dropped, the amount of
radiation to which they could have been exposed, was at a level that does not support claims of
subsequent injury or disease."). But see House Hearings, supra note 2, at 5 (Senator Paul Simon
testifying that the levels of radiation in the cities "we now know ... were ten times what was
considered safe").
384. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 189 (statement of Dr. L. Hobson, VA Dept. of Medicine
and Surgery).
385. Id. at 13.
386. See supra note 333.
387. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 109 (prepared statement of Donald L. Ivers).
388. Id. at 2 (statement of Hon. Donald Applegate).
389. Id. at 38 (statement of Dr. Bross).
390. Id. at 7 (Hon. G.V. Montgomery stated that the VA's annual budget for fiscal year 1986
was $26 billion).
391. 616 F.Supp. 759 (D.C.Cal. 1985).
392. Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1985, PUB L. No. 98-525, § 1631, 98 Stat.
2492, 2646-47 (1984), (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2212 (Supp. 1987)).
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393
Appearing as section 1613 of the 1985 Department of Defense Au-
thorization Act,394 the Warner Amendment mandated that existing and
future actions brought against corporate contractors involved in any
facet 395 of United States atomic weapons development and testing pro-
grams be converted into suits against the federal government.396 The con-
gressional rationale for providing all past, present and future atomic
contractors with sovereign immunity protection rests upon the "unique"
governmental functions they perform in relation to defense and national
security objectives.397 This rationalization is closely aligned with Feres'
concern for military discipline in that each stifles judicial intervention
into military decisionmaking.
Draconian in effect, the Warner Amendment provides private con-
tractors with a Feres defense, deprives atomic veterans and all future
atomic tort victims of their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, and
negates an opportunity to employ fact-finding mechanisms, such as ex-
pert witnesses and cross-examination of adverse witnesses, for suits are
routinely dismissed on summary judgment motions. 398 The legislation
has also been challenged, unsuccessfully, as violative of Fifth Amend-
ment due process protections.399
In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation shut
the final door to court awarded relief for atomic veterans. The constitu-
393. In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 616 F.Supp. 759, 761
(D.C.Cal. 1985), aff'd sub. nom. Konizeski v. Livermore Labs, 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied 108 S.Ct. 1076 (1988).
394. See supra note 392.
395. "[C]ontractor includes a contractor or cost reimbursement contractor of any tier partici-
pating in the conduct of the United States atomic weapons testing program .... Such term also
includes facilities which conduct or have conducted research concerning health effects of ionizing
radiation in connection with the testing." 42 U.S.C. § 2212(d) (Supp. 1987) [emphasis added].
396. 42 U.S.C. § 2212(a) (Supp.1987). The Act affected thousands of existing suits, yet there
was no floor discussion on the suit conversion issue and no congressperson took responsibility for its
inclusion in the legislation. Taylor, New Act Restricts Atomic Test Suits, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1984,
§ 1, pt. 1, at 26, col. 1.
397. See Note, 1985 Department of Defense Authorization Act: Leaving Atomic Veterans at
Ground Zero, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 414-18 (1986) (authored by Jane Malloy) [hereinafter
Ground Zero]; cf United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063 (providing Feres protection to civilian
governmental employees engaging in military activity); Riley, supra note 310 (providing a detailed
analysis of the Johnson decision).
398. 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 225, at 77-79 (prepared statement of Alvin Guttman,
Esq.).
399. See, eg., In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 616 F.Supp. 759,
766-71 (D.C.Cal. 1985); see also Ground Zero, supra note 397, at 435-43 (providing analysis of the
constitutional claim).
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tionality of the Warner Amendment was proclaimed and the United
States government, as sole defendant, successfully dismissed the suits via
a Feres defense.4' Yet the injustice did not cease. The Molsbergen post-
discharge "governmental awareness" claim was specifically addressed.
The California court remarked:
The undisputed facts before the court show that test officials knew and un-
derstood throughout the periods in question that nuclear radiation created
a health hazard. By the early 1940s a large body of literature existed on the
subject.... In August, 1946, the government knew that radiation emitted
by the test explosions was 'the most toxic chemical yet known,' with a mi-
croscopic amount constituting a lethal dose to man.4°"
The FTCA's discretionary function exception was applied to the
governmental "policy decision" not to warn.4°2 The court asserted judi-
cial reexamination of judgments made during a forty-year coverup
"would ... hamper the government in its future conduct of weapons
tests and similar operations affecting the national security." °3
Cole v. United States' followed a similar route to "discretionary
doom" on remand. An Alabama district court determined that the gov-
ernment's decision not to warn was imbued with policy considerations,
and thus "[e]fficacious operation of the government would be severely
hampered" if "judicial second-guessing" were to intrude upon the immu-
nity intentionally created by Congress via enactment of the discretionary
function bar.4"5 Thus the independent post-discharge claim evaporated
under a mushrooming cloud of despicible irony-truth meant defeat.
Evocation of the discretionary function exception and its dominance
in battles with radiation claims does not end with atomic veterans. In
Allen v. United States,"6 a masterfully written, 215-page opinion grant-
ing relief to nine Midwest civilians exposed to radiation during Nevada
test shots4 7 was reversed in fewer than six pages by the Tenth Circuit.
400. 616 F.Supp. at 777-79.
401. Id. at 777.
402. Id. at 774-777.
403. Id. at 774.
404. 755 F.2d 873 (11th Cir. 1985), dismissed on remand, 635 F.Supp. 1185 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
405. 635 F.Supp. at 1191; cf supra text accompanying note 62 (addressing a similar argument in
the post-Civil War era).
406. 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987); cf. Blaber v. United States, 332 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1964)
(discretionary function bar dismisses claims by AEC workers exposed to deadly thronium in labora-
tory explosion). Property damage claims have also been dismissed. See, eg., Bartholomae v. United
States, 253 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1957) (discretionary function exception dismisses claim alleging negli-
gence in determining the radius of an atomic blast).
407. For the text of the opinion, see Allen v. United States, 588 F.Supp. 247 (D.Utah 1984)
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While an opinion's length is no gauge of its excellence, the discretionary
function exception's ability to skate smoothly over perplexing issues,
such as causation, becomes evident. Moreover, the resultant deprivation
of the incentive to contest governmental tortfeasance reverberates far
into the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, while reaffirming Feres and evoking the discre-
tionary function exception on its own, has avoided addressing all A-
bomb related suits. District and circuit courts of appeal echo centuries-
old rationales dressed in new clothes. Congress has broadened Feres'
reach through passage of legislation aimed at both past and future vic-
tims of atomic disasters. Meanwhile, massive defense appropriations are
approved annually.
Atomic weapons producers, "people" in constitutional terms,
40 8
now possess sacred sovereign immunity status and expend governmental
grants" 9 on public relations campaigns geared towards generating sup-
port for nuclear weapon development.
The VA, an administrative body designed to compensate military
servants for personal sacrifices,41 continues to portray bomb-generated
radiation as noninjurious. Chief executives of late repeat this decades-old
position.
411
Myopic visions of winnable nuclear wars, 1940s images temporally
misplaced in the 1980s, focus on perpetual armament. Scientific-educa-
tional institutions further arms development by teaching the young that
nuclear weapons provide employment and research funds.
4 12
The mass media raises its voice only in rare instances. Freedom of
(Judge Bruce Jenkins presided over the action). See also Problems and Prospects, supra note 249, at
303-12 (providing an excellent breakdown analysis of Jenkins' opinion).
408. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) (holding a corporation is a "person"
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
409. See, eg., HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1107, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984) (over $140 million in federal tax dollars are spent annually on public rela-
tions campaigns for defense contractors).
410. See, eg., 38 U.S.C. § 310 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
411. The threat of an embarassing veto override caused Ronald Reagan to sign a bill amending
VA adjudication procedures bearing upon atomic veterans' claims. See President Approves Three
Major Vets Bills, P.R. Newswire, May 23, 1988 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, omni file).
412. See, eg., 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 225, at 93-94 (prepared statement of Dorothy
Legarreta, Adm. Dir., Nat Assoc. of Radiation Survivors) (discussing the University of California's
role in atomic bomb development); cf. C. PURCELL, THE INDUSTRIAL MILITARY COMPLEX 338-40
(1972) (providing statistics on defense contracts given to American Universities).
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the press seems controlled by our natural craving for security-news
nonviolent to propagandized visions that help us sleep in this frightening
world.41
This critique of law and life in our technologically driven society is
harsh, but few can deny its cynicism is well deserved. We can continue to
pretend all is fine and well or look beyond blinding historical trends, ad-
mit our mistakes, and acknowledge the value of life. Unfortunately, the
military-industrial complex is evidence that warnings accompanying
technological change often go unrecognized.4 14 Yet there are signs of
hope.415
Grappling with conceptual problems entrenched in sovereign immu-
413. On the mass media as a powerful propaganda tool, see J. ELLUL, supra note 15, at 102-05,
162.
414. [A]s modem life is becoming more and more complex it is dangerous to give too
much sovereignty to those who are after all dealing with the rather simpler aspects of life
involved in economic relations....
If there is one iota of wisdom in all the religions or philosophies which have supported
the human race in the past it is that man needs vision and wisdom to determine what
things it would be better to do without. This profound human need of controlling and
moderating our consumptive demands cannot be left to those whose dominant interest is
to stimulate such demands. mo what goods are ultimately worthwhile producing from
the point of view of the social effects on the producers and consumers almost no atten-
tion is paid. Yet surely this is a matter which requires the guidance of collective wisdom,
not to be left to chance or anarchy.
Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 29-30 (1927).
415. In May 1988, President Reagan signed the Radiation Exposed Veterans Compensation
Act, thereby instituting the first legal remedy for atomic Veterans. 38 U.S.C.S. § 312 (Supp. 1989),
as amended by Act of May 20, 1988, PuB. L. No. 100-321 (1988). The Act compels the VA to
acknowledge a presumption of service connection for twelve specific forms of cancer (38 U.S.C.S.
§ 312(C)(2)(A-M) (Supp. 1989), provided the disease causes a disability of at least ten percent within
forty years of the soldier's last date of involvement in "radiation-risk activity." Id. at § 312(C)(3)&
(4)(A). The legislation also applies to leukemia victims, but the manifestation-period is reduced to
thirty years and lymphocytic leukemia is specifically excluded. Id. Radiation-risk activity includes
onsite participation in nuclear device testing, involvement in the occupation of Hiroshima or Naga-
said before July 1, 1946, and internment as a prisoner of war in Japan during the bombings. Id. at
§ 312(C)(4)(A) & (B)(i-iii). While the Act represents a breakthrough in the victims' battle for relief,
there exist troubling circumstances surrounding the new law's enactment. For example, on its face,
the long overdue Act suggests broad coverage, yet only 4,000 claims by atomic veterans and their
survivors are expected to qualify for benefits in 1989. See 10:4 National Association of Atomic Veter-
ans News, 1988, at 4, col. 2. Over 250,000 service persons participated in atomic testing. See supra
note 5. Moreover, at least one atomic veterans' activist referred to the benefits provided under the
legislation as a "drop in the bucket." States News Service, Apr. 25, 1988 (LEXIS, NEXIS library,
Omni file) (quoting Pat Broudy). Viewing the legislation as a mere "foot in the door," Pat Broudy,
Regional Vice President of the National Association of Radiation Survivors, predicted that only a
small number of exposed veterans would be affected. Id. Her prediction appears valid, given that
only 50,000 atomic veterans were presumed alive in 1986. Petersgabe Fuentes, Victims of Radiation
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nity's historical foundation demonstrates a perpetual current of illogic
and unfairness. Simple answers to perplexing questions usually chase
themselves until the problem fades away. The ill-conceived Blackstonean
demagogue died. Revolutionary and Civil War financial crises passed.
But the atomic bomb continues to thrive, while those who touch it gener-
ate immunity from responsibility. Those touched by it, however, are im-
mune from nothing. The bomb protects, coerces, dictates foreign policy,
generates profit, creates jobs, educates, influences political elections, and
shows neither mercy nor vulnerability. The simple truth is that the bomb




or Men Undergoing Effects of Aging?; 'Atomic Veterans' Push Claims, L.A. Times, Aug. 28, 1986,
§ 1, at 20, col. 1.
In addition to scope of coverage problems, congressional and executive reactions to the legislation
provide cause for concern. Prior to approval of the legislation, many Senate Republicans voiced
opposition, fearing floodgates of administrative relief would open in the atomic injury arena. See
States News Service, surpa. Moreover, as Senator Alan Cranston has suggested, Ronald Reagan may
have signed the bill merely to avoid political embarassment. "It's surprising that the president re-
jected the veto recommendation [of White House advisors] .... I can only surmise the president saw
the handwriting on the wall and decided to save Senate Republicans from an embarassing veto
override vote." Statement of Senator Alan Cranston, May 20, 1988, quoted in id. Reagan also dis-
pelled any notion that the new legislation was an official admission that bomb-generated radiation
killed atomic veterans:
[Approval of this legislation] does not represent ajudgment that service-related radiation
exposure covered by the [A]ct in fact caused any disease. [But rather] .. .gives due
recognition to the unusual service rendered by Americans who participated in military
activities involving exposure to radiation generated by the detonation of atomic
explosives.
Statement of Ronald Reagan, May 20, 1988, quoted in id.
416. Acts 10:34.
